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THE REVISION OF ARTICLE 2: ROMANCING THE PRISM
JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
I belong to a mature' group of law professors who were fortunate enough to be assigned to teach commercial law early in our
careers. The vast landscape of the new Uniform Commercial
Code frightened not only students but seasoned practitioners of
the art.' I was more than pleased to be among those who embraced the opportunity to explore the U.C.C. and attempt to
unveil its mysteries. Even when assigned to teach the entire

Code, there was a tendency to concentrate our scholarly efforts
on particular articles and sections. Some became fascinated with
the relatively certain, only slightly changed and necessarily rule-

* President and Professor of Law, Duquesne University. The author is the former Dean of the University of Pittsburgh and Villanova University Schools of Law.
The author expresses gratitude to his research assistant, Kim Koerner, a third-year
student at the Duquesne University School of Law, for her assistance.
1. I use the term "mature" advisedly. When my wife's opthamologist had to
break the news that the next prescription would be for bifocals, he explained that
her eyes had become "more mature." My doctor, however, was more blunt. I changed
doctors.
2. It may be desirable to explain the process of assigning courses in the "old"
days. After agreeing to my first contract as a law professor, I informed the dean
that I would teach antitrust law, trade regulation, and two seminars in the antitrust
field, which reflected my graduate work. The dean kindly informed me that I would
teach contracts and commercial law. There is much to be said for this process. Without it, some who made significant contributions to certain subjects may not have
done so; Prosser, for example, who had not chosen to teach torts.
3. Law students who manifested a sound understanding of the Code would often
be sought after by law firms. Even in the late 1960's and early 1970's, several of
my students reported that they were not only hired, but were immediately identified
as "the U.C.C. expert" in the firm. Older practitioners had mastered the intricacies
of the Uniform Sales Act, where the apotheosis was "title," or the elusive and particularly non-uniform antecedents to Article 9 which emphasized conditional sales, chattel mortgages, factor's liens, and trust receipts. The thought of surrendering their
vested interests to master a Code which eliminated "title" as an analytical construct
and eschewed diverse forms of security to emphasize a unitary security device was
anything but inviting. Notwithstanding the intricacies of this new Code, many practitioners assumed that it merely tinkered with certain provisions of the Uniform Sales
Act and the other statutes it replaced-a view that, in the vernacular, caused Karl
Llewellyn to go "ballistic." See infra note 29.
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oriented Article 3 dealing with negotiable instruments (replacing
"bills and notes") and its then new complement, Article 4, which
provided some uniformity in the collection and payment of instruments. Others decided to focus on Article 9, which promised
uniformity and stability in the highly confused and awkward
law of secured transactions, with its sometimes mysterious relation to bankruptcy law. The high value of certainty in our law
becomes exponential in the world of negotiable instruments,
bank collections, and secured transactions. It was more than
possible to pursue these efforts with little or no concern over the
jurisprudence of the guru of the Code, Karl Llewellyn, who was
obsessed with the idea of infusing reality into contract and sales
law.
Those who decided to devote most of their creative moments
to Article 2 necessarily were involved in the great adventure of
exploring Llewellynesque leeways with the pervasive but pliable
principle of good faith,4 the elusive standard of conscionability, 5
and the central and frustrating quest to discover the factual
bargain of the parties 6 -their "true understanding."7 If these
standards seemed vague and indefinite, Llewellyn presented the
even more general standard of decency. He aimed to create a
new sales law that would fully recognize "decent" commercial
practice.8 If a merchant operated within the parameters of "de-

4. Section 1-201(19) states the general definition of good faith as "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990). Section 2103(1)(b) adds "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade" for "merchants," defined in § 2-104. Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
5. Id. § 2-302.
6. Section 1-201(3) defines agreement:
"Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this
Act (§§ 1-205 and 2-208). Whether an agreement has legal consequences
is determined by the provisions of this Act, if applicable; otherwise by
the law of contracts (§ 1-103). (Compare "Contract.").
Id. § 1-203(3).
Section 1-201(11) defines contract: " 'Contract' means the total legal obligation
which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and other applicable rules of law. (Compare 'Agreement.')" Id. § 1-201(11).
7. Id. § 2-202 cmt. 2.
8. Llewellyn suggested that the pre-Code law worked only by being ignored by
the decent business man. See infra note 29. With respect to unread fine print
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cency," the merchant could do no wrong and the legal system
should permit the merchant's actions?
After concentrating on selected sections of the Code that troubled courts and scholars, I suggested that Article 2 was like a
prism, with each section operating as a facet of the prism." I
further asserted that it was not possible to understand and
therefore operate the Article 2 machine effectively without understanding its prismatic nature. These premises led to the
necessary conclusion that judicial and scholarly mistakes about
Article 2 were caused by deficiencies in understanding the nature or "underlying philosophy" of Article 2 that I had described
earlier as the identification of the actual or presumed assent of
the parties. While providing a macro exploration of the Article 2
landscape, this summary effort" occasionally paused for micro
examinations of isolated sections. These sections demonstrated
what I believed to be clear and convincing evidence of the prismatic nature of Article 2, and its eternal search for the factual
bargain of the parties.
Throughout these explorations, like others, I devoted considerable time and effort to the writings of Karl Llewellyn, the 'Ta-

(boilerplate) clauses, he argued that one should be bound "to any not unreasonable
or indecent terms" on the seller's form. See infra note 9.
9. Karl Llewellyn suggested that "dickered terms" were terms to which the parties have consciously adverted:
The answer, I suggest, is this: Instead of thinking about 'assent' to
boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far as concerns the specific,
there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically,
are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of transaction, and but
one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific
assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have
on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of
the dickered terms. The fine print which has not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which
constitute the dominant and only real expression of agreement, but much
of it commonly belongs in.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COmON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960);
see also U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 1 (1990).
10. John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 2 (1981).
11. I suggested this concept in a paper that I prepared as the 1981 FoulstonSiefkin Lecturer at Washburn University School of Law. Unfortunately, illness precluded my trip to Washburn though I sent the paper, that was published in the
Washburn Law Review. Murray, supra note 10.
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ther" of the Code and the principal draftsman of Article 2. The
dearth of anything like genuine legislative history compelled an
examination of Llewellyn's apparent intention. 2 More than
that, however, I developed a fascination with the often radical
views, verbal incisions, and angular writing style that this
"Corbinized" American legal realist brought to monistic contract
law, coupled with his obsession for the law merchant which
called for a radically new paradigm in commercial transactions.
Although the judicial explorations of Article 2 rarely mentioned the views of Llewellyn directly, courts felt compelled to
rely heavily upon the writings of the law professors who paid
great attention, if not homage, to his myriad statements. The
scholars rarely paused to inquire whether the views of Llewellyn
were relevant. Even assuming we could discover with great
precision what Karl Llewellyn intended to suggest in one or
more sections of Article 2, should we care, or, at least, should we
care very much?
The question becomes particularly important as we confront a
revision of Article 2. Should we attempt a radically new design
of Llewellyn's product, or should we retain the underlying philosophy that was so important to him and pursue only isolated
modifications to ascertain the usual values of certainty, stability,
and predictability in this quintessence of commercial law?
The Article 2 Study Project," which was a desirable forerunner to any revision, suggests no intentional change in the jurisprudence of Article 2.'4 I cling to the view that the essential

12. The New York Law Revision Commission Hearings and Reports were unique
sources of legislative history. Even they, however, featured Karl Llewellyn, who testified in his usual forthright (some would say "blunt") manner. See 1 STATE OF N.Y.
LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT: HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 15882 (reprint ed. 1980) (1954) [hereinafter N.Y. COMM'N HEARINGS].
13. The Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
American Law Institute in conjunction with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a study to consider whether Article 2 should
be revised and, if so, to report on what revisions might be required. A nine member
Study Group was appointed in March 1988, to identify "major problems of practical
importance" in the interpretation and application of Article 2. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2, PRELIMINARY REPORT (1990) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
REPORT].
14. An executive summary of the PreliminaryReport as well as revisions thereto
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purpose of Article 2 is and should continue to be the fulfillment
of those expectations created by the factual bargain of the parties, as best we can recreate such bargain from the language and
circumstances surrounding it. I have focused on the Article 1
definitions of "agreement" and "contract" as critical foundational
concepts necessary to discover the purposes of Article 2. Agreement is "the bargain of the parties in fact" as manifested by
their language or other relevant circumstances including trade
usage, course of dealing, and course of performance. 5 "Contract," on the other hand, has been defined in terms of effect,
i.e., "the total legal obligation which results from the parties'
agreement." 6 The "agreement" is so important that, within
very broad limitations, it can even vary the effect of Code provisions. This is a principle'7 of this "semi-permanent piece of legislation." 8 Thus, we are supposed to attempt to discover the
factual bargain (agreement) as best we can and recognize the
factual bargain as the contract of the parties, within the parameters of legality and in the absence of fraud, mistake, bad faith,
and unconscionability. The Code emphasizes that we should not
be making contracts for the parties-a view that was espoused
at common law but often smothered by technical requirements.
To attain the most precise identification of that factual bargain, the current Article 2 rejection of technical requirements"

are found in FEB Study Group: Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46 BUS. LAW. 1869 (1991).
15. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1990).
16. Id. § 1-201(11).
17. See id. § 1-102(3) & cmt. 2.
18. Id. § 1-102 cmt. 1.
19. Among the examples of the anti-technical nature of Article 2, the comment to
§ 2-101 focuses upon the contract (agreement) between the parties and rejects the
technical application of the concept of "title": "The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something,
the passing of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and actions of a tangible character." Id. § 2-101 cmt.; see
also id. § 2-204(3) ("Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fall for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."); id. § 2-206
cmt. 1 ("Formal technical rules as to acceptance ... are rejected .... ."); id. § 2209(1) ("An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding."); id. § 2-209 cmt. 1 ("This section seeks to protect and make
effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard

1452

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1447

not only should continue but should be enhanced to remove the
remaining impediments. Llewellyn removed most of them and
would have removed more had he not been confronted with the
diabolical necessity of pragmatic compromise. The identified
factual bargain should be constrained only by the normative
standards of honesty in fact, commercial reasonableness (i.e.,
"good faith"),20 and conscionability that pervade the current
Article 2. Violations of any of these standards evidence an "indecent" bargain that should not be enforced as a contract.
Those who have taught and written about Article 2 for many
years have little doubt as to what is wrong with it. If we also
have embraced sporadic opportunities to invade the real world of
commerce and dealt not only with the lawyers but with the
people who make contracts for a living, we have had the opportunity to refine our academic insights in the illumination of real
people making millions of real deals every day. My perception of
what is wrong with Article 2 and how it should be changed are
the product of both dimensions. My views are not necessarily
those of any other person or group, including but not limited to
the members of the Article 2 Study Project, notwithstanding my
deep respect and admiration for the insights produced by the
Project.2 What follows, therefore, is my individual perception of
various sections of Article 2 and how they should be revised. I
deal only with those sections or other views of certain sections
which I find quite troublesome. Some clarifications, minor language changes, or additions in other sections or their comments
may also be desirable.
II. THE AGREEMENT PROCESS

The precise identification of the factual bargain of the parties
is, of course, problematic. The parties to a purported contract reto the technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments.").
20. The "merchant" definition of "good faith" in § 2-103(1)(b) combines honesty in
fact with commercial reasonableness whereas the Article 1 definition in § 1-201(19),
which applies to all parties, requires only honesty-the good heart but "empty head"
standard.
21. With the exception of the views in this Article that are expressly different
from the views suggested in the Preliminary Report of the Article 2 Study Project,
supra note 13, I am in agreement with the views of members of the Study Group.
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fuse to adhere strictly to any formalities. After moving from
status to contract, the history of contract in society moved even
more clearly and continuously from formalisms to our present
situation, where a knowing wink or less may manifest the completion of a factual bargain that should be viewed as an agreement. Lawyers and judges often are forced to distill massive
amounts of data in the search for an offer and acceptance that
will form a contract if they are accompanied by a proper validation device such as consideration, assuming the parties have the
capacity to form a contract.
Decent merchants, however, do not speak of offer and acceptance. Their writings are not called offers or acceptances. They
are called purchase orders and acknowledgment forms, delivery
orders, invoices, requests for prices, quotations, letters of intent,
and many other names. The parties make many oral agreements
that they usually confirm with subsequent writings. The oral
communication between the parties rarely is formalized in terms
of offers, counteroffers, acceptances or the like. They speak of
"deals" or "closed deals," "rush orders" and "prompt shipment,"
as well as myriad other terms that only those in the trade would
understand. Their actual conversations almost never mention
warranties or remedies, particularly consequential damages, or
arbitration in the event of disputes. Decent merchants are anything but astute in clearly manifesting their intention to be
contractually bound before or only after a formal document is to
be executed.2 2
For many years it has been an open secret that the innumerable prefabricated forms used to evidence a contract go unread
and would not have been understood by decent and reasonable
parties, including merchants, if they had been read.2 3 No one

22. The largest civil judgment in American legal history was based on the jury
determination of this ambiguous intention where an "agreement in principle" was
found to be an intended binding agreement. Pennzoil was awarded more than $11
billion. The appellate court affirmed but remitted $2 billion of the $3 billion in punitive damages awarded by the jury. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768
(Tex.Ct. App. 1987).
23. An entire body of literature on the "duty to read" clearly manifests the tension between effectuating good faith, decent and conscionable deals, and the value of
stability in contracts, particularly if one or more of the unread clauses in the printed form, signed by the decent party, is a material, risk-shifting device that such a
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reads the boilerplate on these forms before or after their use
unless trouble occurs. When trouble occurs, we have one of those
"hospital cases" to which Llewellyn referred, causing the parties
and their lawyers to scurry to read the fine print for the first
time in an attempt to discover a legal analysis that has, at best,
a coincidental relationship to the factual bargain of the parties.
The printed, standardized forms that evidence most of the contracts made daily in America are created by lawyers who, in the
best summation of their effort, "tend to draft to the edge of the
possible" in developing ironclad protection for their respective
clients.' The situation is exacerbated where parties present
their respective "Monitors" and "Merrimacs" in a sea filled with
the "battle of the forms."
Our common law of contract operated on the principle that we
could not only identify an offer and who made it, but, in most
cases, we could determine the particular manner of acceptance
demanded by the offeror (i.e., whether the acceptance was required to be by promise or by performance). Though we recognized the possibility of a doubtful offer, where the evidence
would be insufficient to determine the required manner of acceptance, thereby necessitating special rules such as the presumption of a promissory acceptance, we used to be convinced that
these "doubtful" offers were rare. In the real world, however,
such an offer is not rare. The typical offer is the "doubtful" offer
(i.e., the "indifferent" offer with respect to the manner of acceptance). In the real world, neither the typical offer nor the ordinary circumstances surrounding the offer require a particular
manner of acceptance."

party would not have reasonably expected to find in such a form. See, e.g., John E.
Murray, Jr., Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 762-72 (1982).
24. "Business lawyers tend to draft to the edge of the possible." 1 N.Y. COMM'N
HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 177 (statement of Karl N. Llewellyn); see also John E.
Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the Battle of the Forms: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV.
1307, 1350-51 (1986) [hereinafter Murray, Chaos]; Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1205 (1983).
25. This and related problems are discussed in John E. Murray, Jr., Contracts: A
New Design for the Agreement Process, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1968) [hereinafter
Murray, A New Design].
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A more sophisticated fallacy of classical and allegedly neoclassical contract law was the notion that contracts are static
(i.e., one-shot, arms-length transactions). In the real world, however, the one-shot deal is rare and the relational contract that
changes over time through the performance of the parties prevails.26
Traditional monistic contract law often insisted on the narrowest of interpretations of the language of the agreement, even
espousing a "plain meaning" of such language and the application of the parol evidence rule, which often confused the purposes of parol evidence with the purposes of interpretation or construction. Successful distinctions between parol evidence and
reformation were particularly rare.2
A related fixation of monistic contract law was the requirement that the parties must include all of the material terms in
their agreement if it were to be sanctioned as a contract. This
approach tended to disfavor heavily used commercial agreements, such as requirements and output contracts, that merchants favored because they allowed for assured sources of supply and fixed prices in an otherwise uncertain economic future.
The "contract law" of Article 2 confronts these and other artifacts of classical contract law by creating a radically new design
for the agreement process.28 Early notions that Article 2 merely
26. Professor Ian Macneil has spent a large part of his career providing insights
into the "relational" contract. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 71-

117 (1980).
27. In Sadowski v. General Discount Corp., 294 N.W. 703 (Mich. 1940), the Supreme Court of Michigan found certain language in a contract to be unambiguous
and, on that footing, applied the parol evidence rule, id. at 704, revealing confusion
between interpretation and the parol evidence rule. The plaintiff then sought reformation in a federal court and prevailed on the basis of a mistaken writing. General
Discount Corp. v. Sadowski, 183 F.2d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 1950).
28. Perhaps the most fundamental change in the radically new design of Article 2
was the movement from a property law to a contract law orientation. Llewellyn was
particularly annoyed with the property concept of "title" as an analytical device that
created artificial and technical barriers to the effectuation of the factual bargain of
the parties. His view is summed up nicely in a comment to § 2-101:
The arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for
sale and the various steps in its performance. The legal consequences are
stated as following directly from the contract and action taken under it
without resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to
pass as being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid making
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tinkered with classical contract law infuriated Llewellyn, who
emphasized the radical nature of his new design. He was emphatic in his insistence that the world of sales law had to
change radically, to conform to decent commercial practice and
to make sense to those engaged in that practice." The
Llewellyn product is a radically new design and, for the most
part, it has been an overwhelming success. Decades of experience with Article 2 have disclosed the failures and they can be
remedied with relatively little effort, thereby preserving the
considerable success of the essential design. It is, however, critically important that those who tinker with parts of Article 2
requiring repair be totally familiar with and committed to the
essential design. As they repair a particular facet of the Article
2 prism, they must not harm materially the prism itself.
A. The FormationProcess-Sections2-204 and 2-206
One of the more radical changes in the contract law of Article
2 often has been overlooked. Section 2-204(1) announces the
principle of this critically important change by allowing a contract for the sale of goods to be formed "in any manner sufficient
to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract."" ° This fundamental
concept then is elaborated generally in section 2-206 and more
specifically in section 2-207. The principle as set forth in section

practical issues between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove by evidence
and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and actions of a
tangible character.
U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt. (1990).
29. Llewellyn was quite disturbed by suggestions that the changes he contemplated in sales law would be designed to change the existing law only in a "few particulars." He was emphatic in his prediction that Article 2 would "remake" sales law
vigorously and over the whole field, in order that the law may be made
to conform to commercial practice, and may be read and make
sense . . . . The changes made are, in fact, deep, wide, vital. And they
are utterly needed in order to produce intelligent and workable commercial law ....
The present law "works" by being ignored by the decent
business man.
1 N.Y. COMMWN HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 113.
30. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1990).

1994]

1457

ROMANCING THE PRISM

2-204(1) requires no modification. The elaborations, however, are
marred and should be repaired.
Section 2-206 begins by preserving the classical rule that the
offeror is the master of the offer,"' before stating the radically
new design allowing the typical offer to be accepted in any reasonable manner or medium. 2 The "doubtful" or "indifferent"
offer would no longer be viewed as a rare offer requiring special
rules. This recognition that real offerors typically do not care
how their offers are accepted brought an end to much needless
judicial discussion." The offeror is still permitted to control the
manner and medium of acceptance through unambiguous language in the offer, and unambiguous "circumstances" would also
dictate a particular kind of acceptance.34 But reality prevailed:
offerors normally do not seek to control the manner or medium
of acceptance, and "unambiguous circumstances" only rarely
manifest a required kind of acceptance. Llewellyn conformed the
basic law of contract formation to real commercial practice so
that the law "made sense."35
The first portion of section 2-206(1)(b) is a species of (1)(a),
which provides elaboration of the typical order or offer to buy
goods for prompt or current shipment, allowing acceptance by
either a prompt promise to ship, or by prompt or current ship-

31. Id. § 2-206. This section begins with the negative proviso that "[ulnless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or the circumstances . . .

,"

the offer

may be accepted in any reasonable manner or medium. Id. Thus, an offer that does
unambiguously require a particular manner or medium of acceptance necessarily controls the kind of acceptance necessary to form a contract.
32. "Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances,
an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner
and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances." Id. § 2-206(1)(a).
33. For example, in the well-known case of Davis v. Jacoby, 34 P.2d 1026 (Cal.
1934), the Supreme Court of California went to considerable pains to explain why a
promissory acceptance was effective in response to an indifferent offer.
34. An offer to the public, for example, would not contemplate a promissory acceptance. Thus, if a particular advertisement were an unusual offer for the sale of
goods to the first person to appear at a given store, the offeree would not be identified though he or she would be identifiable. The circumstances surrounding such an
offer clearly indicate that only performance, not promissory acceptance, would be in
order. See Leikowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn.
1957).
35. See supra note 29.
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ment.36 This elaboration is desirable, as is the remainder of
section 2-206(1)(b), which treats the shipment of even nonconforming goods as an acceptance and simultaneous breach absent
a seasonable notification that the nonconforming
goods have
7
been shipped as an accommodation to the buyer.1
The idea that the shipment of nonconforming goods, absent
notice of accommodation, operates as an acceptance, is rarely
emphasized in discussions of section 2-206. If a seller ships
goods with the manifested intention of accepting the offer, the
shipment will constitute an acceptance even though it proves to
be nonconforming." Thus, even though a nonconforming shipment fails to match the terms of the offer, the sacred "matching
acceptance" or "mirror image" rule of classical contract law gives
way to the overriding manifestation of the parties' intention "to
close the bargain."39 The factual bargain of the parties, that is,
the real agreement or true understanding of the parties as best
we can tell from their conduct, prevails over technical rules of
classical contract law. The resulting contract will be in accord
with the offer which, by shipment of even nonconforming goods,
the seller will be said to have accepted. Since the shipment is
nonconforming, the contract is not only formed but breached by
such shipment. ° If time for performance remains under the
contract, the seller will have the right to cure the nonconformity.41

The very limited case law in this area suggests no difficulty
with the application of the foregoing principles. Therefore, only
the comments to this portion of section 2-206 need be changed
and elaborated to insure this desirable analysis. In particular,
comment 4 suggests that "a notification of shipment" referring to
the offer is essential to discover an acceptance of the offer by

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
cure

U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (1990).
See id. § 2-206 cmt. 4.
Id.; id. § 2-206(l)(b).
Id. § 2-206 cmt. 4.
Id.
Id. § 2-508(1). Under § 2-508(2), circumstances may allow a longer time for
if the seller had reasonable grounds to believe the nonconforming tender would

be acceptable with or without a money allowance and seasonably notified the buyer
of his intention to cure. Id. § 2-508(2).
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such shipment." No particular form of notification should be
essential. Thus, an invoice containing a purchase order number
would be a sufficient reference. Moreover, absent any notice, the
circumstances may be clear that the shipment was intended to
close the bargain and therefore should operate as an acceptance
even though the goods are nonconforming.4"
The single flaw in section 2-206 requiring statutory change
occurs in subsection (2), which requires notice of performance
within a reasonable time where the offeree has chosen to accept
by beginning performance." While the question of notice of a
performance acceptance has been bothering courts for well over
a century,45 it should have been clear by the time Article 2 was
crafted that notice is not necessary in a performance acceptance
unless the offeror would not become aware of the performance
promptly.46 Under no circumstances should notice be considered
part of the acceptance. Rather, it is an implied condition where
the offeror would not be in a position to become aware of acceptance within a reasonable time. Section 2-206(2), however, would
have us believe that where the beginning of performance is a
reasonable mode of acceptance, "an offeror who is not notified of
acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance."47 This formulation suggests that
notice is part of the acceptance where the offeree accepts by
performance.48 Comment 3 to this section removes the last
42. See id. § 2-206 cmt. 4.
43. Like the Study Project, I would also add a sentence in the comments approving the "mailbox" rule. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 65. While § 1103 can be viewed as the residual section for the retention of such a common law
rule, it would not be harmful to remove the last scintilla of doubt.
44. U.C.C. § 2-206(2) (1990).
45. See, e.g., City Natl Bank v. Phelps, 86 N.Y. 484 (1881).
46. See, e.g., Bishop v. Eaton, 37 N.E. 665, 667 (Mass. 1894).
47. U.C.C. § 2-206(2) (1990).
48. Llewellyn and friends may have been unduly influenced by cases such as
Kresge Department Stores v. Young, 37 A.2d 448, 449 (D.C. 1944) ("[Nlotice is necessary to be given to the guarantor that the person giving the credit has accepted
or acted upon the guaranty .... ."), and German Savings Bank v. Drake Roofing
Co., 83 N.W. 960, 961 (Iowa 1900) ([The so-called guaranty is a mere offer or proposition, and is not complete until the party making the offer is notified of its acceptance, when the minds of the parties meet, and the contract is completed."). It is,
however, clear that Llewellyn did not view the notice requirement as barring revocation of the offer once performance by the offeree had begun. See Report and Second
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scintilla of doubt by stating, "it is essential that notice follow in
due course to constitute acceptance."49
The notice requirement in section 2-206(2) applies only where
"the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode
of acceptance." 0 But where a buyer of goods observes the goods
being installed on its premises or the beginning of manufacture
of the goods in the seller's plant, a failure to notify formally
should not bar the enforcement of the contract. "Beginning
performance" is a relatively rare mode of acceptance. The typical
"beginning performance" acceptance occurs where the seller
promptly ships the goods. Unfortunately, only a comment tells
us that section 2-206(2) was not intended to apply to such a
"shipment" acceptance. 2 From the comment we learn that
"shipment," as used in section 2-206(1)(b), is used in the same
fashion as "shipment" in section 2-504, dealing with the seller's
duties in the typical F.O.B. "shipment" contract. 3 If goods are
shipped by the offeree and received by the purchaser within the
time a reasonable notice would have arrived, a formal notice
would not be necessary.54 If the seller's own truck were used to

Draft: The Revised Uniform Sales Act, in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 269,
357 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly compiler, 1984) [hereinafter UCC DRAFTS] (including a

comment to then alternative section 3-F, stating that, "[tihe giving of such notice,
however, is a matter which has no need at all to coincide with the moment at
which revocation is barred").
49. U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 3 (1990).
50. Id. § 2-206(2) (emphasis added).
51. See id. § 1-102 cmt. 1. This comment indicates that "the proper construction of
the [Code] requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its reason."
Id. This is simply a reminder of the old adage in our law that, where the reason for
the rule stops, so should the rule.
52. Id. § 2-206 cmt. 2.
53. Id.; see id. § 2-504 cmt. 1.
54. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts indicates that in the normal situation of
"shipment" of goods as an acceptance of an offer, notice is not necessary because the
shipment acceptance "will come to the offeror's attention in normal course." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 62 cmt. b (1979). Notwithstanding its pervasive
commitment to follow the Code, the Restatement accepts the preferred analysis that
notice is essential as a condition after a performance acceptance only where the former offeror will not learn of the performance acceptance promptly and with reasonable certainty. Id. § 54(2).
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deliver the goods, however, "loading on [that] truck might be a
beginning of performance under subsection (2).""5
Section 2-504 contains its own notice requirement as one of
three duties of the seller under such a contract. Such a seller
must "promptly notify the buyer of the shipment.""6 That requirement, however, is severely mitigated by the last paragraph
of section 2-504, which indicates that a failure to notify would be
a ground for rejection of the goods "only if material delay or loss
ensues."57 Such material loss or delay also must have been
caused by the failure to notify.5" Where acceptance is by "shipment," the contract is formed by such shipment.59 Thus, the
notice requirement in a "shipment" contract is clearly not part of
the acceptance. It is a conditioning event, and if it does not occur, the buyer has the right to reject only if the buyer has suffered material loss or delay caused by the failure to notify.
Clarifying the requirement of notice and the effect of a failure
to notify corrects the flaw in section 2-206. Notice should be expressed as a condition to the duty of the buyer created when
performance has occurred or begun. Where performance has
occurred through an acceptance by shipment, a contract is
formed by such shipment. Notice is a condition to the duty of the
buyer only where the buyer would not become aware of such
shipment promptly. Section 2-206 should expressly refer to the
last paragraph of section 2-504 to indicate that the failure to
notify should discharge the buyer's duty only where such failure
has caused material loss or delay.
Where acceptance occurs through the beginning of performance, such beginning of performance should be seen as an
acceptance of the offer forming a contract." Indeed, section 2-

55. U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 2 (1990).

56. Id. § 2-504(c). Section 2-504 requires an F.O.B. shipment seller to (a) put the
goods in the possession of a reasonable carrier and make a reasonable contract for
their transportation, (b) obtain and promptly deliver or tender any necessary documents to enable the buyer to take possession of the goods, e.g., a bill of lading, and
(c) promptly notify the buyer of the shipment. Id. § 2-504.
57. Id. § 2-504.
58. See Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Intl (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 105859 (9th Cir. 1983).
59. See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (1990).
60. Under the common law, the beginning of performance in response to an offer
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206(2) contemplates the beginning of performance as "a reasonable mode of acceptance."6 Notice should not preclude the enforcement of the contract where the offeror was or should have
been aware that performance has begun. Again, notice is a condition that should be implied only where the offeror would be
unaware of the start of performance. Even where the offeror has
no basis for assuming performance has begun, it would be desirable to limit the failure of notice to situations where the offeror
has suffered material loss or delay (i.e., the section 2-504 notice

that could only be accepted by performance precluded the revocation of the offer. It
was often said that the "unilateral" contract would be formed only by the completion
of such performance, but justice should preclude the revocation of the offer once performance had begun to enable the offeree an opportunity to complete performance.
Thus, original § 45 of the Restatement of Contracts achieved this result by discovering a contract upon part performance, conditioning the offeror's duty upon receipt of
complete performance. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1932). Comment b to that
section set forth the more desirable fiction that the original offer contained an implied promise that, if performance were begun, the offeror would not revoke the offer
for a reasonable time. Id. § 45 cmt. b. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
the new § 45 finds a similar implied promise that is accepted by part performance,
thereby forming an option contract to make the main offer irrevocable. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1979).
Comment 3 to § 2-206 states: "Nothing in this section . . . bars the possibility
that under the common law performance begun may have the intermediate effect of
temporarily barring revocation of the offer, or at the offeror's option, final effect in
constituting acceptance." U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 3 (1990). This is a curious and confusing statement. If the offer is one of the rare offers that can only be accepted by
performance, the beginning of performance is not an acceptance, even though it does
operate to bar revocation. If the offer is the typical offer allowing acceptance by
either promise or performance, the beginning of performance must operate as the
acceptance, i.e., the failure to complete performance begun in response to the typical
"indifferent" offer necessarily would constitute a breach. Thus, under the old and
now discarded usage of "unilateral" versus "bilatera contracts, a unilateral contract
is formed only upon complete performance. At the time of formation, one right and
one correlative duty exist. Such a "unilateral" contract, however, results only where
the offer can only be accepted by performance. Again, the beginning of performance
in such a contract does not form the contract, though it does bar revocation of the
offer. Where an offer can be accepted either by promising or performing, the beginning of performance is an implied promise forming what used to be called a "bilateral" contract with two rights and two correlative duties. In this situation, therefore,
there is no need to consider ways in which revocation of the offer may be barred
since the offer already has been accepted, For further elaboration and discussion of
§ 2-206 and original as well as Restatement (Second) of Contracts provisions, see
JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 45C (3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS].

61. U.C.C. § 2-206(2) (1990).
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requirement in "shipment" contracts). 2 This clarification not
only would provide symmetry, it would also emphasize the underlying philosophy of Article 2. Requiring notice where the failure to notify would have made no difference is a technical requirement that disturbs the factual bargain of the parties.
In summary, the awkward, unclear, and analytically unsound
notice requirement, with its suggestion that the offer may be
viewed as having lapsed even after an acceptance of that offer,
mandates revision of section 2-206. The remedial attempt to
reconcile the language of section 2-206 with sound analyses in
the later Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides ample support for such a revision.6 3 The fact that section 2-206 does not
appear to trouble courts should not be the deciding factor in
making this change.6

62. Thus, a buyer's failure to notify a seller of a used tractor that was to be
retrieved from a field may cause material loss or delay to the seller, or a second
buyer, if the seller sold the item to the second buyer after not receiving notice within a reasonable time that the first buyer had retrieved the tractor. See Petersen v.
Thompson, 506 P.2d 697 (Ore. 1973).
63. Because the American Law Institute was half responsible for the U.C.C. and
totally responsible for the" Restatement, and because the U.C.C. is the enacted law
with respect to contracts for the sale of goods, it is anything but remarkable that
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes every effort to "follow the Code." Thus,
with respect to the notice requirement, the primary analysis of the second Restatement calls notice a condition by indicating that the failure of notice where the offeree has reason to know that the offeror has no adequate means of learning of the
performance with reasonable promptness and certainty results in the discharge of
the contractual duty of the former offeror. RESTATEM1ENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 54(2) (1979). In what appears to be a transparent effort to reconcile this analysis
with U.C.C. § 2-206(2), illustration 1 to § 54 states that, in such a situation, the
offeror may treat the offer as having lapsed unless the former offeree sends notice
within a reasonable time. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 54(2) cmt. b,

illus. 1 (1979); see Murray, A New Design, supra note 25, at 796-800; see also
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 60, § 46C.

64. The Article 2 Study Project recommends no change in § 2-206 because the
case law evidences no great difficulty at this time. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note
13, at 64. Like physicians, however, lawyers should remove a potentially cancerous
growth even though the patient is suffering no present distress.
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B. The FormationProcess-Section2-207, the "Battleof the
Forms"
The enormous volume of ink allocated to attempts to explain
the "battle of the forms" may be per se evidence of the need for a
revision of section 2-207.65 When I review my own writings concerning the "battle," I am sure that I began with the hope that
they might contribute to a refined and sophisticated judicial
understanding of what Llewellyn was trying to accomplish. Together with the product of others, my own work someday might
have supported that magnificent landmark opinion that would
illuminate the path to be followed in later judicial applications
of section 2-207. I notice subsequent scholarly attempts that
continue in that vein, if the repeated citation of my constructive
criticism is any gauge of such efforts.66
I finally concluded that my efforts had been quixotic. The
courts just didn't get it and were never going to get it.67 Some
of the blame had to rest with Llewellyn and those who subsequently tinkered with that "murky bit of prose"68 in section 2207. A lot of the blame, however, had to be laid at the feet of
courts committed to vested notions of classical contract law and
with virtually no understanding of the underlying philosophy of
the radically new Article 2.
Having arrived at the conclusion that Llewellyn's preferred
solution through the common law tradition was not workable,69

65. As one of the principal contributors to this deluge of ink, I feel primarily
liable.
66. See, e.g., Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A
Framework for Making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 893 (1991).
67. See Murray, Chaos, supra note 24.
68. Southwest Eng'g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 473 P.2d 18, 25 (Kan. 1970); see
also Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962) ("The
statute is not too happily drafted."); Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co., 460 F. Supp. 163, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (calling § 2-207 "[a]n enigmatic
section of the Code").
69. Llewellyn was particularly conscious of the problems of dealing with commercial practices through statutes. "lAin approach by statute seems to me dubious, uncertain, and likely to be both awkward in manner and deficient or spotty in scope."
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960) [hereinafter
LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW]. He wanted courts to elaborate the framework he designed in the common law tradition with particular emphasis upon the purpose of
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I announced my surrender in a lengthy analysis that described
the chaos of the "battle of the forms."" That analysis stopped
short of presenting a suggested revision of the language of section 2-207. Not thinking it my place to suggest the precise language, I was content to set forth the pathologies of section 2-207
as then construed by the courts. My students then challenged
me to create my own suggested revision. With considerable reluctance, express recognition of the immense difficulty of creating an effective revision, and emphatic disclaimers as to its
finality and soundness, I presented a suggested revision as nothing more than a "working draft" or a "beginning" of the process
of revising section 2-207. 71 I subsequently learned another lesson in the continuing education of life: law professors ignore dis-

the statute. Article 2 is singular in its emphasis upon purposive interpretation and
construction. Again, this emphasis is not remarkable in light of Llewellyn's jurisprudential proclivities. "A piece of legislation, like any other rule of law is, of course,
meaningless without reason and purpose." KARL N. LLENVELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 228
(1962). "[A] statute must at need be implemented to effect its purpose by going far
beyond its text." Karl L. Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counseling and Advocacy-Especially in Commercial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 181 (1946). No

other statute so expressly relies upon judicial elaboration, analogy, and fidelity to its
underlying purposes than Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 2 may
be viewed as a set of common law guidelines providing a context through which
courts may mold and remold what a comment to Article 1 calls a "semi-permanent"
piece of legislation into a body of merchant law which reacts effectively to the needs
of commercial society. Article 2 can be understood only as a prism, with each section
representing one facet of that prism. See Murray, supra note 10, at 2; see also Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621, 631-33 (1975) (arguing that the Code is more a method of analysis than a law); Julia B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 798
(1978) (stating that words are not like crystals, which remain unchanged).
70. See Murray, Chaos, supra note 24.
71. The introduction to my "newly designed § 2-207" states:
Discussing the design of the new § 2-207 is considerably easier than
drafting it. It may be premature to suggest such a structural change and
it is probably presumptuous to suggest a draft with changes of this magnitude. The importance of this change is sufficient reason for suggesting
the following working draft as the beginning of the new process. I will be
more than pleased to accept any suggested change that permits a more
effective use of the § 2-207 concept as part of the underlying philosophy
of Article 2. With that less than perfect disclaimer, the following draft is
submitted.
John E. Murray, Jr., A Proposed Revision of Section 2.207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 J.L. & COM. 337, 355 (1986).
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claimers printed in law journals to the same degree that merchants ignore warranty disclaimers in standardized printed
forms. 2 What follows, therefore, is not a defense of my suggested "working draft." Rather, it is an attempt to summarize my
thinking about the purposes of section 2-207 and to suggest
ways and means, other than precise statutory language, to effectuate those purposes in keeping with the underlying philosophy
of the most precise identification of the factual bargain of the
parties possible.
The purpose of section 2-207 is a paradigmatic manifestation
of the purpose of Article 2: to discover the genuine factual bargain of the parties. Where parties used prefabricated forms to
evidence their deal, classical contract law insisted on identifying
the offer and then examining the purported acceptance to discover whether a contract had been formed. A purported acceptance
containing different or additional terms was considered a conditional or qualified acceptance, which could not be an acceptance.
Because it was not an acceptance and we had to call it something, we called it a counteroffer. Neither the offeror nor offeree,
of course, were particularly aware of this disparity between offer
and acceptance. They concentrated exclusively on the "dickered"
terms of the deal, i.e., those terms to which they consciously
adverted, such as the description of the goods, the quantity, the
price and other terms which the decent merchant consciously
would consider. 3 When these terms matched, the parties assumed they had a contract, but the technical barrier of the
matching acceptance or "mirror image" rule insisted that no
contract existed because the response to the offer contained
boilerplate provisions (created by the seller's lawyer) disclaiming
warranties, excluding consequential damages, or insisting on
arbitration of any dispute between the parties. The response to
the offer, therefore, had to be a counteroffer-not because the
seller intended it to be a counteroffer, but because the seller's

72. See Daniel A. Levin & Ellen Blumberg Rubert, Beyond U.C.C. Section 2-207:
Should Professor Murray's Proposed Revision Be Adopted?, 11 J.L. & COM. 175
(1992).
73. See supra note 9.
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lawyer had "protected" the seller, causing the matching acceptance rule to mandate that legal conclusion.
Though no contract was formed, the seller shipped the goods.
Assuming that a contract had been formed, the seller thought it
had to ship. The buyer accepted the goods for the same reason.
The parties thought they had a "closed deal"-their factual bargain was complete. 4 If the goods were conforming and nothing
went awry, everybody was happy. Where something went wrong,
however, the seller would claim for the first time that it had
made a counteroffer because of the different terms in its response to the offer. Moreover, the seller would insist that the
buyer had accepted these different terms by accepting the goods.
That argument prevailed under the algebra of the matching
acceptance rule.
Section 2-207 sought to remedy this and related problems by
recognizing a definite expression of acceptance as an acceptance
even though it contained undickered different or additional
terms. Early on, it occurred to me that there was insufficient
emphasis upon the nature of a definite expression of acceptance
that contained different or additional terms. It was essential to
understand that "acceptance" as one that would be regarded as
an acceptance by a reasonable and decent offeror. The implication was clear that one reasonably could understand such a
response to an offer as an acceptance because a reasonable and
decent merchant-offeror would not read or understand the different or additional terms secreted in the boilerplate of the response.75
Moreover, these additional or different terms could be, and
often were, important terms-material terms-that attempted to
divest the buyer of critical warranty and remedial protection or
to deprive the buyer of its day in court by mandating arbitration.

74. "Under this Article a proposed deal which in commercial understanding has in
fact been closed is recognized as a contract." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 2 (1990).
75. "Because the forms are oriented to the thinking of the respective drafting
parties, the terms contained in them often do not correspond. Often the seller's form
contains terms different from or additional to those set forth in the buyer's form.
Nevertheless, the parties proceed with the transaction." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (1990).
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The first major judicial attempt to apply section 2-207 was an
incredulous reaction to this radical change. 6 The matching acceptance rule was so vested in the minds and hearts of those
who had learned about the "matching acceptance" rule in the
first month of their courses in contract law that they simply
could not assimilate the incredible idea that a response to an
offer containing a materially different term operated as an acceptance.7 7 Subsequent courts finally managed to assimilate
this iconoclastic change. While they recognized the change in the
matching acceptance rule,"5 this awareness exhausted their understanding of section 2-207. The judicial "computers" simply
had insufficient capacity to absorb the remaining essential analyses of section 2-207. Karl Llwewllyn had not cast his pearl far

enough.
As in other sections of Article 2, Llewellyn wanted to provide
the necessary foundation or framework in which judicial elaboration of the modification of the matching acceptance rule would
occur. Neither in section 2-207 nor in other sections did he attempt to provide a comprehensive guide. He recognized that "an
approach by statute seems... dubious, uncertain, and likely to
be both awkward in manner and deficient or spotty in scope" 9
and the underlying purpose of the entire Code was "to permit
the continued expansion of commercial practices."' ° Even more
important, however, was his faith in the common law tradition.
He expected judges to be astute in their application and elaboration of this and other new directives in order to discover the
factual bargain of the parties. Whatever may be said about the
inability of the language of section 2-207 to effect the results
Llewellyn intended, the fatal flaw was his gross overestimation
of the ability of the collective judicial mind to achieve that goal.

76. See Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
77. Roto-Lith has been criticized frequently. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. (Am.) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman
Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1972); Ebasco Servs. Inc. v. Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., 402 F. Supp. 421, 437-38 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 571, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Steiner v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 569 P.2d 751, 763 (Cal. 1977).
78. See Dorton, 453 F.2d at 1165-66.
79. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW, supra note 69, at 370.
80. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1990).
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The result is a judicial caricature of Llewellyn's design that is
diametrically opposed to the underlying philosophy of Article 2.
Under current judicial constructions of section 2-207, where a
definite expression of acceptance contains materially altering
terms such as a disclaimer of warranty or exclusion of consequential damages," l the acceptance remains effective. The additional terms, however, do not become part of the contract under
section 2-207(2)(b) because they materially alter the terms of the
offer. If the offeror took advantage of either section 2-207(2)(a),
by expressly limiting the offer to the terms of the offer, or section 2-207(2)(c), by notifying the offeree of objection to any additional terms, the additional terms do not become part of the
contract regardless of their materiality.8 2
In the typical case where the buyer is an offeror who sent a
standardized purchase order and the seller is the offeree who
includes deviant terms in a printed acknowledgment form, the
seller is not pleased to lose the battle of the forms. The seller's
lawyer is at least as anxious about her client winning the battle
as is the buyer's lawyer. The assured path to victory is to have
the buyer sign the seller's form. The typical seller, however,
recognizes that this might lose a sale and the marketing department will not abide this result. To continue the relationship
with the buyer, the seller resorts to making a counteroffer.
There are various ways in which this can be accomplished, including a blatantly clear statement that the response to the offer
is a counteroffer. Again, the seller's marketing department will
object to this straightforward approach. Seller's lawyer is forced
to create a printed form that will insure counteroffer status in a
surreptitious fashion, yet avoid the possibility that the buyer

81. Id. § 2-207 cmt. 4; see, e.g., Frank M. Booth, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 754
F. Supp. 1441 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Middletown Eng'g Co. v. Climate Conditioning Co.,
810 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991). Another typical additional or different term in
the acceptance is an arbitration provision which may also materially alter the terms
of the offer. E.g., Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709 (7th
Cir. 1987); Dixie Aluminum Prods. Co. v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 785 F. Supp. 157
(N.D. Ga. 1992).
82. Lawyers often take maximum advantage of these somewhat redundant provisions by drafting redundant clauses such as, "This offer expressly limits acceptance
to the terms of this offer and notice is hereby given that buyer objects to any different or additional terms contained in any response to this offer."
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will be alarmed and recognize that no contract exists upon receipt of the acknowledgment. With the aid of the courts, lawyers
have discovered the magic formula for making such a surreptitious counteroffer that will never be read or understood by the
offeror.'
By inserting a printed clause that tracks the last proviso of
section

2 - 2 0 7 (1

),' the seller's lawyer ascertains that every ac-

knowledgment sent by her client will be construed as a counteroffer. Even though the actual parties making the deal for their
respective entities will believe that 'they have made a contract
because they have made a factual bargain, the technical barriers
will prevent recognition of that factual bargain. Courts apparently feel compelled to arrive at this result because they see no
escape from treating the magic formula language of the last
provision of section 2-207(1) as creating a counteroffer. 5
Having created this technical monster, the courts assumed
responsibility for its control. The unassailable logic of the analysis to this point would suggest that, after the formula counteroffer, the subsequent shipment and acceptance of the goods should
require the court to recognize that the counteroffer, with all of
its terms favoring the seller, was accepted by the purchaser
through acceptance of the goods. Courts, however, recognize that
the reasonable and decent buyer would not regard the response
to the purchase order as a counteroffer because such a buyer
would not have read or at least understood the formula language

83. For example, in Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir.
1972), the court held that the phrase, "This order is given subject to all of the
terms and conditions on the face and reverse side hereof. . . " was not sufficient to
constitute a § 2-207, last proviso, counteroffer. Id. at 1164. With this judicial guidance, it is no surprise to find different language in a later acknowledgment: "Seller's
acceptance is, however, expressly conditional on Buyer's assent to the additional or
different terms and conditions set forth below and printed on the reverse side."
C. Itoh & Co. (Am.) v. Jordan Int'l, Inc., 552 F.2d 1228, 1230 (7th Cir. 1977).
84. See U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1990) (" . . . unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.").
85. In his testimony before the New York Law Revision Commission, Professor
Llewellyn explained his intention concerning the last proviso of § 2-207(1): "We were
attempting to say . . . that a document which said, 'This is an acceptance only if
the additional terms we state are taken by you' is not a definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance but is an expression of a counter offer." 1 N.Y. COMMN
HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 181.
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as creating a counteroffer. They expressly view the formula
counteroffer as "ambiguous.""6 Then, to avoid oppression to the
offeror, they control their created monster by repudiating the
classical contract law concept of acceptance by conduct, which
was not only unchanged by section 2-207 but emphatically reaffirmed in section 2-204(1). They do so by contorting the language of the last proviso to section 2-207 to require express assent by the offeror to any additional terms in the acknowledgment that appear to be a definite expression of acceptance but
are not, because of the technical and surreptitious counteroffer.' Thus, no contract exists on the seller's terms. Neither
does the buyer's form control. The contract is made by conduct
under the nefarious section 2-207(3),"9 and the terms of that
contract are those on the exchanged forms that match while the
nonmatching terms are excised, leaving gaps. The gaps are filled
with the "supplementary" terms of Article 2, all of which favor
the buyer (warranties, consequential damages, etc.). Again, the

86. In the words of one court, the seller "injected ambiguity" in its response to
the offer. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1238.
87. "A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to
show agreement, including conduct by both parties

....

"

U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1990)

(emphasis added).
88. See Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1235; Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161,
1167-68 (6th Cir. 1972).
89. In a letter to Professor Robert Summers, Professor Grant Gilmore made the
following statement regarding § 2-207:
The 1952 version of 2-207 was bad enough .

.

. but the addition of

subsection (3), without the slightest explanation of how it was supposed
to mesh with (1) and (2), turned the section into a complete disaster ....
My principal quarrel with your discussion of 2-207-and all the
other discussions I have read-is that you treat the section much too
respectfully-as if it had sprung, all of the piece, like Minerva from the
brow of Jove. The truth is that it was a miserable, bungled, patched-up
job-both text and Comment-to which various hands-Llewellyn,
Honnold, Braucher and my anonymous hack--contributed at various
points, each acting independently of the others (like the blind men and
the elephant). It strikes me as ludicrous to pretend that the section can,
or should, be construed as an integrated whole in light of what "the
draftsmen" "intended." (I might note that, when subsection (3) was added,
Llewellyn had ceased to have anything to do with the project).
Letter from Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert Summers, reprinted in
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 54-55 (3d ed. 1981).
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buyer wins the battle of the forms, to the frustration of the seller.
The buyer should win the battle in this sequence, but not
because of section 2-207(3). Rather, the buyer (and the seller)
thought they had a closed deal via the exchange of forms. There
was a factual bargain at that point because the response to the
offer looked like a definite expression of acceptance, notwithstanding the formula language. But courts feel compelled to
treat the formula language as a technical counteroffer while
admitting that it would not be understood as a real counteroffer.
Thus, they overcome this awkward analysis with another awkward analysis: they change the normal operation of counteroffers. It might be said that, if everything comes out right, why
worry? Unfortunately, everything does not come out right.
Sellers will not quit. Like a frustrated cartoon character, the
seller has an endless supply of thrusts. The next thrust is the
ingenious one of turning its quotations or proposals into offers.9 ° If the quote is an offer that contains the usual warranty
disclaimer and remedy limitations, the buyer's purchase order
may appear to be a definite expression of acceptance even
though it expressly or impliedly contains the normal warranty
and remedy protection afforded buyers by Article 2. Because the
buyer's "additional" terms (the normal Code terms) "materially
alter" the terms of the offer, they are excised under section 2207(2)(b) and the seller, finally, wins the battle of the forms
solely and exclusively because the seller has made the offer.91
The typical buyer, of course, has no idea that the terms of this
transaction will depend upon who turns out to be the offeror.
Buyers would have to go to law school to determine whether a
given quote or proposal is an offer rather than an invitation to

90. One multinational corporation has chosen to stamp its quotations with a.conspicuous phrase informing the buyer that its quotation is an offer. In addition to
gaining the benefit of characterizing the seller as an offeror, stamping preprinted
forms saves the expense of creating new forms until the old supply is exhausted.
91. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 373 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. Ct. App.
1985) (finding that the warranty terms of the original contract were not effective
because they materially altered the terms of the contract), reu'd on other grounds
388 N.W.2d 584 (Wis. 1986) (finding that the original contract had been modified
orally to include a warranty).
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make an offer, and even then, they would not have time to analyze every quote or proposal received during the working day.
In addition to the fact that this analysis is the apotheosis of
technical and artificial rules that belie the factual bargain of the
parties, it supports the "evil" that section 2-207 was supposed to
remove. Under the pre-Code law, the seller-offeree would win
the battle through its counteroffer containing different or additional terms because the seller fired the "last shot" in the battle
of the forms. Under the contorted analysis of section 2-207, the
offeror wins the battle solely and exclusively because the offeror
fired the "first shot" in the battle. The current judicial analysis
of section
2-207 has been aptly described by one court as "Byz92
antine."

Another frustration of section 2-207 spawning great difficulty
and endless scholarly debate is the mystery of the inclusion of
"different or additional" terms in section 2-207(1), while section

92. See Phillips Petroleum, 388 N.W.2d at 590. There is a possible counter to this
device by sellers. Because purchasing agents will not be able to determine whether a
given quote is an offer or an invitation to make an offer, the purchase form could
contain a clause that turns the purchase offer into a formula counteroffer where the
quote is an offer. Such a clause might read as follows:
Whether construed as an offer or acceptance, this purchase order
incorporates the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code protecting the
buyer including but not limited to all warranties and remedies again
including, without limitation, consequential damages. If this purchase
order is construed to be an offer, this offer is expressly limited to the
terms of this purchase order [§ 2-207(2)(a)]. Notice of objection is hereby
given to any different or additional terms contained in any seller's form
relating to this offer [§ 2-207(2)(c)]. If this purchase order is construed to
be an acceptance, this acceptance is expressly conditioned on seller's
assent to any different or additional terms contained on the front or
reverse side of this purchase order.
Under the extant judicial interpretation and construction of § 2-207, this clause
could be the doomsday weapon in the battle of the forms. If the purchase order
would have been construed as an acceptance, the clause converts it into a formula
counteroffer. There would be no contract via the exchange of forms. If the seller
then ships, there would be a contract by conduct under section 2-207(3)(a) which
would include matching terms from the exchanged forms (the dickered terms) while
the nonmatching terms would be excised, leaving gaps. The gaps would then be
filled with Article 2 "supplementary" or normal terms which favor the buyer.
If such a "doomsday" clause effectively allowed the buyer to win every time
because of the technical games played by lawyers who draft such clauses, the ultimate repudiation of the underlying philosophy of Article 2 would be complete.
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2-207(2) refers only to "additional" terms. 3 This phrasing may
have been a printer's error 94 or it may have been intentional. If
section 2-207(2) means to include only "additional" terms, we
may deal with "different" terms in the exchanged forms through
Professor White's "knockout" view," which has gained a follow-7
ing in the courts,96 or Professor Summers' "fallout" view,9
which has not had such judicial success.98 I have taken the position that "different" should be read into section 2-207(2) because it is otherwise unworkable. If section 2-207(1) recognizes a
definite expression of acceptance though it contains "different or
additional" terms, what does one do with the "different" terms if
section 2-207(2) is relegated to "additional" terms?99 In addition
to comment support in section 2-207(2),"' I have focused upon
the statutory language of section 2-207(2)(b) recognizing that the
"additional" terms in an acceptance can "materially alter" the
terms of the offer.'"' If a definite expression of acceptance may
contain terms that "materially alter" the terms of the offer, it is
difficult to understand how such terms could always be construed as only "additional" rather than "different" terms. Since
Llewellyn seemed preoccupied with "material alterations" rather
than the nomenclature of "different" vs. "additional," 2 and because the distinction between "different" and "additional" terms
is difficult at best in many cases,' the prudent course is to
include "different" in section 2-207(2). If nothing else is done to

93. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1990) with id. § 2-207(2).
94. See John L. Utz, More on the Battle of the Forms: The Treatment of "Different"
Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 UCC L.J. 103, 105 (1983).
95. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-

3, at 34 (3d ed. 1988).
96. E.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984);
Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1979); OwensCorning Fiberglass Corp. v. Sonic Dev. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1982).
97. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 95, § 1-3, at 29.
98. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 373 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. Ct. App.
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 388 N.W.2d 584 (Wis. 1986).
99. Murray, Chaos, supra note 24, at 1354-65.
100. See U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (1990) (stating that § 2-207(2) covers both additional and different terms).
101. Id. § 2-207(2)(b).
102. See Murray, Chaos, supra note 24, at 1365 n.219 (analyzing the "different vs.
additional" "puzzle").
103. Id. at 1363-65.
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section 2-207, "different" should be added to the statutory language of section 2-207(2).
The section, however, requires more extensive revision than
merely adding the term "different" to section 2-207(2). The comprehensive revision should recognize the normal terms attending
the typical contract for the sale of goods. All of the warranty and
remedial protections of the buyer in Article 2 are normal terms.
Terms that would replace the normal terms are deviant
terms." 4 The factual bargain of the parties is our goal and this
objective means that we must avoid the absurdity of enforcing
unread and unbargained-for surreptitious clauses that allocate
risks on a technical and artificial basis. It is clear beyond peradventure that this assumption was the bedrock upon which Article 2 was created.' 5 I once referred to this philosophy as the
0
avoidance of "incipient unconscionability.""'

104. Commenting on current printed form clauses and their relation to the norms
of the Code, Professor Todd Rakoff noted, "[Tihe parties' contractual power is now
exercised primarily in specifying deviation from the standardized plan rather than in
defining the obligation ab initio." Rakoff, supra note 24, at 1182.
105. A 1941 report on an early draft of the Uniform Revised Sales Act (later to
become Article 2 of the Code) contained some classic Llewellyn prose on what was
then called § 1-C:
"Written" bargains, in the days when the rules about them crystallized, were bargains whose detailed terms the two parties had looked
over, and the rule was proper, that a signature meant agreement. When,
however, parties bargain today, they think and talk of such matters as
price, credit, date of delivery, description and quantity. These are the
bargained terms. The unmentioned background is assumed without mention to be the fair and balanced general law and the fair and balanced
usage of the particular trade. Displacement of these balanced backgrounds is not to be assumed as intended unless deliberate intent is
shown that they shall be displaced; and deliberate intent is not shown by
a lop-sided form whose very content suggests that it has not been carefully read, and the circumstances of whose execution suggest that the
matters under discussion and consideration were only the matters written
or typed in.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, REPORT AND
SECOND DRAFT OF THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT 52-53 (1941), reprinted in 1

UCC DRAFTS, supra note 48, at 269.
106. In another article, I remarked:
The fundamental difference between the purpose of 2-302 and the purpose of 2-207 . . . is exposed. The former deals with nullifying terms of a
contract because they unfairly surprise and oppress the party against
whom they would operate. On the other hand, 2-207 presents a threshold
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The simplest and clearest draft to achieve this result begins
with the removal of offer and acceptance terminology from the
section to avoid "first shot" or "last shot" analyses. The revision
should direct courts to view a manifestation of the parties' intention to form a contract as forming a contract on the matching
dickered terms 10 7 on the assumption that they also have

agreed to include normal Code terms. Deviant terms that would
materially alter such dickered or normal Code terms should not
be operative unless the party asserting such deviant terms sustains the burden of proving manifest assent to such terms by the
other party. The clearest manifestation of such assent would
occur where the other party expressly has agreed to the deviant
terms. That express agreement could be evidenced by a party
signing the other's form containing such deviant terms.
We could stop here, of course, and insist that the normal Article 2 terms apply absent such express assent. We might go further and give effect to a clear and conspicuous seller's response
to a purchase order that the seller will not be bound by the
normal terms. If this response were so clear that a reasonable
and decent buyer receiving such a response could not avoid understanding that the seller does not intend to be bound by the
normal terms of the Code, the buyer would not be justified in
understanding the creation of a factual bargain. Thus, when a
purchase order initiates the transaction, an acknowledgment
that clearly and conspicuously states that the seller does not
accept certain U.C.C. terms but will ship the goods exclusively
on its own terms, the acceptance of the goods after receipt of
such a clear statement of the deal proposed by the seller would

question: What are the terms of the contract? If a party would not reasonably understand that certain terms were included in the contract ab
initio, they will not be included, because their inclusion would unfairly
surprise and oppress the party against whom they would have operated.
Section 2-207, therefore, may be viewed as addressing incipient unconscionability-its philosophy is identical to 2-302's.
Murray, Chaos, supra note 24, at 1321-22 (citing John E. Murray, Section 2-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39
U. PriT. L. REV. 597 (1978)).
107. If the manifested dickered terms do not match, the parties have not met the
threshold test to form a contract and further analysis is superfluous. See Koehring
Co. v. Glowacki, 253 N.W.2d 64 (Wis. 1977).
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form a contract on the seller's terms. This result should never
occur if the acknowledgment or other form of response is in any
way ambiguous or confusing to a reasonable and decent merchant buyer. Again, the burden must be on the party proposing
the deviant terms to assure complete communication of such
deviations and a clear manifestation of assent to them by the
other party. Whether such complete communication and assent
have occurred necessarily involves interpretation and construction, some uncertainty and lack of stability, and the attendant
transaction costs of such an analysis. All of these consequences
can be avoided by insisting that, unless one signs a form containing deviant terms, such terms will be inoperative. This proposed solution, however, is a rather draconian view. I prefer to
allow an acceptance by conduct, remembering that acceptance
requires more than mere receipt of the goods." 8
If, however, the first communication contains deviant terms,
(e.g., the seller includes warranty disclaimers and the like in a
quotation that might be an offer), my preference would allow
such terms to be operative only if the buyer-offeree signs the
seller's document containing such terms. This draconian view is
based upon our experience with the fundamental distinctions
between offers and mere invitations to make offers. As all present and former law students know, whether a given quotation or

108. Apparently, some commentators forget to make this distinction. In an analysis
of my Proposed Revision of Section 2-207, supra note 71, one commentator worried

about internal communication within a buyer's company that would result in unknowing receipt of the goods by employee X after purchasing agent or other official
(Y) received a clear and understandable counteroffer from the seller. Levin & Rubert,
supra note 72, at 196. If Y were aware of the counteroffer, as she ought to be under

these facts, and did not wish to accept it, she could communicate that decision to X
or X's department without difficulty. The author seems to suggest insuperable obstacles to this practice. The reason this practice is not followed at present is because
buyers and their representatives are not aware that the response to their offers are
counteroffers because they do not comprehend the surreptitious formula counteroffers
found in so many acknowledgment forms. Moreover, even if X were unaware of the

decision to reject the counteroffer when the goods first arrived, mere receipt of the
goods should not constitute acceptance of the offer, just as anyone does not accept
goods deposited in a mailbox or in a similar place at our homes or when a package
containing unknown contents is handed to the homeowner or a member of the family. Again, there is a difference between "receipt" and "acceptance." Cf U.C.C. § 2201(3)(c) (1990) (stating the distinction between "receipt" and "acceptance" in the
statute of frauds).
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the like is an offer is a question of interpretation that can be
very difficult." 9 Unless all buyers and their agents become sufficiently educated in the law to distinguish quote-offers from
quote-invitations, it is foolish to expect a buyer to make that
distinction with clarity and certainty. In a given situation, even
a lawyer may have to advise that the interpretation could go
either way. Article 2 protects buyers against the inadvertent
creation of firm offers by requiring a separate signing." ° If we
are so terribly concerned that a buyer may be snookered into
making a firm offer, it seems at least as important to protect the
buyer against material, risk-shifting clauses in documents he
does not sign which would bind the buyer only because courts
may construe it to be an offer. My change would eliminate the
"first shot" analysis, since the sending of a typical purchase
order in response to a quotation-offer that contained deviant
terms, not signed by the purchaser, would preclude the deviant
terms from operative effect. Again, we could go further and
allow operative effect to deviant terms in an offer that is so clear
and conspicuous that the other party could not reasonably misunderstand the terms upon which the offer is made. As in the
analysis of counteroffers, this change would have its attendant
costs.
The modified section 2-207 should contain a clear listing of
typical deviant terms. While such a list can never be exhaustive,
it could be sufficiently complete to avoid the overwhelming majority of potential disputes. Such a list obviously would include
warranty disclaimers and limitations or exclusions of various

109. See, e.g., Interstate Indus. v. Barclay Indus., 540 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1976)
(finding that a quote was not an offer); Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 369
A.2d 1017 (Md. 1977) (finding that a quote was an offer). In Empire Machinery Co.
v. Litton Business Telephone Systems, 566 P.2d 1044 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977), it is
patently clear that the president of the plaintiff corporation was unaware that he
had made the offer when he signed the defendant's printed form. Id. at 1044. In a
"battle of the forms" context, it is more than questionable whether the plaintiff focused upon the defendant's proposals as offers with all of the consequences flowing
therefrom in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 373 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 388 N.W.2d 584 (Wis. 1986).
110. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1990); see also id. § 2-209 (requiring a separate signing of a
no oral modification clause by a nonmerchant where the form is supplied by a merchant).
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remedies, including consequential damages. I also would include
arbitration clauses which have given rise to questions of materiality."' If parties who deal with each other on a regular basis
prefer arbitration, they can execute a separate blanket agreement manifesting their intention to arbitrate with respect to any
future deal. A residual clause in section 2-207 should provide a
definition of materiality to direct courts to deal with other terms
not listed.
If one of the exchanged forms contains an additional immaterial term, it should be an operative term of the contract. If one
form contains an immaterial term that differs from the immaterial term in the other form, neither term should be operative.
The term should be supplied pursuant to the gap-fillers in Article 2, trade usage, or prior course of dealing.
The final problem in section 2-207 was central to Llewellyn's
thinking about this section."' Parties commonly form contracts
by telephone or in person and then confirm the deal through the
exchange of their prefabricated forms, which are the same forms
they would use absent any prior oral contract. Section 2-207(1)
attempts a double play. "A definite ...expression of acceptance

or a written confirmation... operates as an acceptance ... ,, 1
A confirmation cannot be an acceptance because the acceptance
has already occurred and a contract was formed. Section 2207(1), however, would have us pretend that the confirmation is
an acceptance. If the written confirmation is sufficient for statute of frauds purposes, the contract becomes enforceable"
even though the confirmation-acceptance contains different or
additional terms. What to do with such terms? We simply proceed to section 2-207(2) as if the confirmation-acceptance were a

111. See id. § 1-205.
112. Matter number 2 is more troublesome. In (sic] deals with the now hopelessly confused situation presented when deals are made by phone or by
shorthand message and "confirmations" are sent on forms which reach
beyond the dickered terms; or when an "acceptance" occurs on "our standard form," and the like-often enough answered by a varying "our standard form" from the other side. The "orthodox" law of offer, counter-offer,
and the like gives no satisfactory answer to this problem.
1 N.Y. COAZIN HEARINGS, supra note 12, at 55-56 (statement of Karl Llewellyn).
113. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1990) (emphasis added).
114. It becomes enforceable "between merchants" under § 2-201(2).
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definite expression of acceptance. Any revision of section 2-207
should distinguish between the use of a confirmation for statute
of frauds purposes (assuming the statute of frauds is not repealed in the revision) and the same confirmation as evidence of
the acceptance of the offer. If the confirmation contains the magic formula language of the last proviso of section 2-207(1),"' it
does not evidence a formed contract because the confirmation is
a counteroffer rather than a definite expression of acceptance.
Though most of our courts now have seen this distinction,"' a
revision should guard against its recurrence.
It is, however, more important for a confirmation to be viewed
as an acceptance, even if it contains formula counteroffer language because such language is not understood to create a counteroffer. It should not be viewed, however, as confirming an
acceptance if it clearly states that it is a counteroffer, in such a
fashion that a reasonable and decent merchant could not avoid
understanding it as such.
Section 2-207 should be seen as an incipient part of the problem of determining the operative effect of standardized forms. If
there is no battle of the forms because both parties have signed
a single standardized form, the basic question of the duty to
read and understand a signed document arises. I believe that
parties should be bound only by what they reasonably expect to
find in such forms and not by unexpected terms. I find support
for this view in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, though
only after considerable exploration." 7 I would like very much
to see an Article 2 section dealing exclusively with this problem
in juxtaposition to section 2-207. The Restatement attempt
fails."' While the Restatement succeeds in clarifying certain

115. Id. § 2-207(1) (stating that additional or different terms can still constitute an
acceptance unless the party makes acceptance conditional on the assent to these

terms).
116. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. (Am.) v. Jordan Int'l, Inc., 552 F.2d 1228, 1230 (7th
Cir. 1977).
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 211(3) (1979) (providing that when
a party believes that the contracting party would not have assented had she known
of a term, that term does not become part of the contract); John E. Murray, The
Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1982) [hereinafter Murray, Standardized Agreement].
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979); see Murray, Standardized
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Article 2 sections on occasion, a revised Article 2 section on
standardized forms could have a major impact in clarifying the
emerging analysis of the problems in this area."9
C. The Statute of Frauds-Section2-201
Should the statute of frauds be retained in a revised Article 2?
Though the country responsible for creating the statute has repealed it except for two sections, 20 the United States is a
much more litigious society and the possibility of escalating
fraud and perjury is real, though a return to the practices of
1677 is not. In a complex commercial society where innumerable
deals are made daily, favorable recollection is inevitable. We
should retain the statute of frauds, but section 2-201 requires
revision.
The first problem is how to deal with electronic message systems. While this is a major problem, it is not an insurmountable
obstacle to the retention of the statute of frauds. An electronic
message, regardless of form, is still a message. Usually, it is
read, albeit on a screen, though in the case of a recording, it is
heard. There will be a record of the transaction even in a
paperless commercial society and the electronic system used will
rarely. be exotic. There will be "reasonable" systems used by
virtually all commercial parties. A "reasonable medium," as used
in section 2-206,21 should include electronic media. In the typical case, the sender will be able to prove the sending and receipt
of the message more certainly and easily than they can now
prove it through the U.S. Postal Service. The simple addition of
"or reasonable electronic message or record" after "writing" in
sections 2-201(1) and (2) may suffice to "permit the continued
expansion of commercial practices" as required in section 1102(2)(b).122 While this solution may appear much too simplis-

Agreement, supra note 117, at 760-61.
119. See Murray, Standardized Agreement, supra note 117; W. David Slawson, The
New Meaning of Contracts: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard
Forms, 46 U. PrrT. L. REv. 21, 57-60 (1984).
120. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 51 (noting that England repealed

its statute of frauds regarding the sale of goods in 1953).
121. U.C.C. § 2-206(a) (1990).
122. Id. § 1-202(2)(b) (stating the expansion of commercial practices as an underly-
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tic, there should be no attempt to distinguish between and
among the various systems now available as well as those that
are unborn.
Another major change is the necessary inclusion of reliance as
an additional satisfaction device. Those who currently favor the
recognition of reliance, like the majority of courts which have
confronted the issue,"2 must ignore the opening phrase of section 2-201, "Except as otherwise provided in this section... " to
include reliance as another way to satisfy the requirements of
the statute.'2 Because clear evidence of reliance should be sufficient to allow enforcement of the contract,2 section 2-201 requires an appropriate addition to section 2-201(3).2' Moreover,
since reliance is a factor in modifications within the statute of
frauds in section 2-209,121 it should be recognized as to the unmodified contract under section 2-201.
In recent years, there has been discussion about the necessity
of the quantity term.12 There can be serious questions about
the quantity term but problems caused by its retention may be
overstated. If we do not require the quantity term, may we also
eliminate any requirement to identify the subject matter of the
contract? Thus, would a check with a notation reading "contract"
or "agreement" be sufficient? The PreliminaryReport of the Article 2 Study Group suggests, "If it is clear from the signed writing that some contract for sale has been made, the statute of
frauds is satisfied and all of the alleged terms, written or oral,
may be proved in the usual way under Article 2. "129 While the
reduction of formal requirements in section 2-201 over its prede-

ing purpose and policy of the Act).
123. See, e.g., Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc., 641 P.2d 628 (Or. App. 1982).
124. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1990).
125. See, e.g., Potter, 641 P.2d at 632 (finding reliance on an oral contract as an
exception to the statute of frauds).
126. U.C.C. § 2-201(3) (1990) (providing three exceptions to the statute of frauds).
127. Id. § 2-209(5) (allowing the retraction of a waiver except when the allowance
would be unjust given a material change in reliance).
128. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding
that the lack of a definite quantity term did not violate the statute of frauds); see
also Caroline N. Bruckel, Considerationin Exclusive and Nonexclusive Open Quantity
Contracts Under the U.C.C.: A Proposal for a New System of Validation, 68 MINN. L.
REV. 117 (1983).
129. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 54.
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cessor is desirable, a reduction to this level may eliminate the
statute of frauds, de facto. It may be preferable to eliminate the
statute de jure which is, after all, the prevailing view of the
Study Group. 3 '
If the statute is to be retained, section 2-201(3)(b) should be
clarified to allow for an admission by a former party, or even an
agent or officer of the defendant, that a contract was made.'
Any confusion concerning the pleading of the statute should be
eliminated by insisting that a pleading deny the making of the
contract. Even then, a deposition should be permitted to allow
the plaintiff an opportunity to adduce facts that a contract was,
in fact, made, notwithstanding the otherwise truthful denial in
the pleadings that a contract was made since the question of
whether a contract was formed requires a legal conclusion.
D. Modifications and Waivers--Section 2-209
There appears to be little if any doubt that section 2-209(1) is
a desirable rejection of the pre-existing duty rule with respect to
modifications. Similarly, there is a consensus that the only desirable change in section 2-209(1) should be to express the implied requirement of good faith.' 2 The remainder of section 2209, however, has been aptly called a "mess." 3
It has been suggested that it took me twenty pages to explain
the remainder of section 2-209,'34 and it did.

35

I think it

would take anybody at least twenty pages to explain it, and that
alone is sufficient reason for revising sections 2-209(2), (3), (4),
and (5). If the "public" statute of frauds in section 2-201 is retained, the problem of whether the contract as modified must
meet section 2-201 standards remains. I recommend a revision

130. Id. at 52.
131. See Miller v. Sirloin Stockade, 578 P.2d 247 (Kan. 1978) (holding that an
admission by a former agent or employee cannot bind the former employer without
authority from the employer).
132. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 25.
133. Douglas K. Newell, Cleaning up U.C.C. Section 2-209, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 487
(1990).
134. Id. at 494.
135. John E. Murray, Jr., The Modification Mystery: Section 2-209 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
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that would require a new writing to evidence the contract as
modified with respect only to terms that section 2-201 requires
to be evidenced by a writing, including the identity of the parties, the subject matter and, notwithstanding quarrels about
whether the quantity term must be included, I would insist that
any new quantity term in a modification be evidenced by a writing.'3 6 In general, of course, the writing must evidence a "real
transaction."'3 7
Because section 2-209(3) insists only that the contract as modified meet section 2-201 requirements, the contract as modified
should be viewed as the contract for section 2-201 purposes.
Thus, any device that would satisfy section 2-201 as to an original contract should satisfy the contract as modified under section 2-209(3). I would include reliance among the satisfaction
devices as suggested in the earlier discussion of section 2-201.
A no oral modification or rescission clause-the "private" statute of frauds of section 2-209(2)-allows the parties to agree that
any change in their deal must be evidenced by a writing. Parties, however, sometimes make changes absent a writing. If a
party can demonstrate reliance, such evidence should suffice to
enforce the modification. Similarly, if any of the other alternate
satisfaction devices of sections 2-201(2) or 2-201(3) are met, the
modification should be enforceable. For example, just as a refusal to enforce an admitted original contract would be absurd, as
section 2-201(3)(b) suggests, a refusal to enforce an admitted
modification similarly would undermine the factual bargain of
the parties. Under one interpretation of the current law which
would be confirmed pursuant to the Article 2 Study Group's
proposal, 138 such an admitted modification would not be enforced because of the technical barrier created by section 2209(2). This is a silly result which is antithetical to the factual
bargain of the parties. The only reason a public statute of frauds
is tolerable and, arguably, even somewhat desirable, is because
it allows for those necessary exceptions that recognize the factu136. A modification of the contract as to price, time or place of delivery or other
terms not required by § 2-201 to be evidenced by a writing in the original contract
should not be required in the contract as modified under § 2-209(3).
137. See U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (1990).
138. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 74.
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al bargain of the parties. To suggest that a no oral modification
clause should have absolute binding effect, regardless of the
circumstances and in the face of a changed factual bargain,
taxes credulity.
Just as an admission should satisfy the requirements of section 2-209(2), if a changed quantity of goods were received and
accepted by the purchaser or if the seller received and accepted
a larger payment for goods than that called for by the contract,
this section 2-201(3)(c) alternate should be sufficient evidence of
the modification. If a confirming memorandum of the modification between merchants was received and not objected to within
ten days, as suggested by section 2-201(2), the failure of the
recipient to object should not preclude enforcement of the contract as modified simply because the recipient did not sign the
writing. Otherwise, we would return to the pre-Code situation
where the recipient could hold the sender and signer of the
memorandum to the changed deal and speculate at his expense
since the recipient would not be bound. Finally, the very narrow
reliance satisfaction device dealing with specially manufactured
goods in section 2-201(3)(a) should also be a sufficient basis to
make the contract as modified enforceable.
If these clarifications of sections 2-209(2) and 2-209(3) were
effectuated in the revision of that section, sections 2-209(4) and
2-209(5) could be and should be eliminated. Section 2-209(4)
contains confusing language as well as the essentially indeterminate concept of "waiver." The Study Group recommended a comprehensive definition of "waiver" in the section language or a
less than comprehensive definition in the comments. 13 9 The
short response to this recommendation is, "Good luck." Which of
the many definitions of "waiver" will be preferred? The more
serious answer is that the concept is totally unnecessary and
any attempt to define it, comprehensively or otherwise, particularly in statutory language is, at best, counterproductive. If the
expanded (reliance included) list of alternate satisfaction devices
becomes operative with respect to the public and private statutes of fraud in sections 2-209(2) and 2-209(3), there is absolutely no necessity to retain subsections (4) or (5). Because sec-

139. Id. at 76.
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tion 2-209(5) operates only to preclude retraction of a waiver
because of reliance, it would be a fortiori superfluous in a section recognizing reliance as a basis for enforcing a modification
without a writing.
III. WARRANTIES

A. Express Warranties
Section 2-313 allows express warranties to be created by
statements, promises or other representations of fact, by description, or by sample or model-but only if they become "part of the
basis of the bargain."4 ° The "basis of the bargain" requirement
has been a mystery since the section was promulgated. The
section and its comments have spawned various analyses by
courts and scholars ranging from those who would insist upon a
showing of reliance to those who reject the necessity of any
showing of reliance. A recent opinion summarized the "divided'
opinion about the meaning of "basis of the bargain" and concluded that a statement of fact about the product meets that standard only if the buyer had knowledge of it prior to buying or
using the product. Such knowledge creates a presumption that
the statement became "part of the basis of the bargain" and the
presumption could be rebutted only by "clear and affirmative
proof."' Comment 3 to section 2-313 adds fuel to the controversy with its statement that "no particular reliance on such
statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric
of the agreement."'
I suggest that reliance should not be necessary at all. I believe
that several courts have misinterpreted "basis of the bargain" by
resorting to classical contract notions of "bargained-for-exchange" and offer and acceptance while, in fact, the "bargain" to
which section 2-313 refers is a continuum that does not begin
and end with draconian notions of offer and acceptance. 4 3 The

140.
141.
other
found
142.
143.

U.C.C. § 2-313 (1990).
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), rev'd in part on
grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2606 (1992). The "clear afrmative proof" language is
in comment 3 to § 2-313(1).
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1990).
See John E. Murray, Jr., "Basis of the Bargain': Transcending Classical Con-
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"bargain" of Article 2 is the factual bargain of the parties, unhampered by the technical constraints of classical contract law.
Comment 7 to section 2-313 aids this analysis by insisting that,
"The precise time when words of description or affirmation are
made or samples are shown is not material. The sole question is
whether the language or samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract.""14 The comment goes on to suggest the enforceability of a post-formation express warranty
which can be viewed as a good faith modification needing no
consideration to be binding under section 2-209(1). Such a postformation warranty does not fit classical notions of "bargain."
Nor does it fit the sacred rule that an offeree must be aware of
the offer before it can be accepted.
To understand the thrust of section 2-313, I urged (and continue to urge) a "reasonable expectation" test that would eschew
any requirement of reliance. 45 I was concerned about the common experience of the modern buyer of goods, consumer or merchant, who purchases a product without full awareness of all of
the features of that product as advertised by the seller. It is not
uncommon for a purchaser of a computer, automobile, vacuum
cleaner, or other product to be unaware of certain features at
the time of purchase. 46 If such a buyer later would become

cepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283 (1982).
144. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (1990).
145. More recently, Professor Charles Heckman has clearly demonstrated Karl
Llewellyn's intention that reliance should not be necessary under § 2-313. See
Charles Heckman, 'Reliance" or "Common Honesty of Speech': The History and Interpretation of Section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 CASE W. RES. L.

REV. 1 (1988) (expressing agreement with my analysis but disagreeing with my proposed "reasonable expectation" test on the footing that this test unwittingly revives
the reliance requirement). My "reasonable expectation" test, however, does not even
indirectly require any showing of reliance. Rather, as I am about to restate in the
text of this Article, it presumes certain "reasonable expectations" on the part of any
buyer of goods as to features of the goods of which the buyer was unaware at the
time of purchase.
146. See JOHN E. MURRAY, JR. & H. FLEcHTNER, SALES AND LEASES 80 (1993).
Problem 28 of this casebook deals with a buyer of a new automobile which is admired by a friend who buys an identical model. The friend's car came with a remote
control that permits the opening and locking of doors and the trunk. The buyer did
not receive that device with his identical car. He discovers certain seller's literature
advertising the device as a standard feature on this model and further discovers
that he is the only buyer of that car in the world who lacks this device. Though he
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aware of such advertised features and discover that the same
product in the hands of other buyers has that standard feature
while her product lacks that feature, such a buyer appropriately
would be disappointed. Such a buyer reasonably expected to own
a product that contained all of the features that such products
were advertised to contain, even if she had no knowledge of a
particular advertisement concerning that feature prior to the
purchase. These reasonable expectations were certainly part of
the basis of her bargain.
Comment 4 to section 2-313 states the "principle that the
whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what it is
that the seller has in essence agreed to sell ... ." To allow a
seller to say, "Yes, I did agree to sell a product with these features, but unless you can prove that you were aware of my
statement to this effect prior to buying it, you are not entitled to
these features," undermines the whole purpose of warranty law.
Section 2-313 should be clarified to remove the last scintilla of a
reliance test and to allow the buyer to enforce express warranties even though the buyer was unaware of such warranties at
the time of purchase. To avoid further confusion, it would be
desirable to remove the "basis of the bargain" phrase entirely
since the phrase invites memories and understanding of the
classical contract concept of "bargained-for-exchange."
B. Exclusion or Modifications of Warranties
1. Express Warranties
The 1952 version of section 2-316(1) stated simply: "If the
agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are
inoperative." Apparently, this appeared too radical for its time.
The Llewellyn recreation in the present section 2-316(1) is a
study in obfuscation. " 8 The first sentence appears to be an in-

did not rely upon that device in deciding to purchase the car, he reasonably expected to receive all advertised standard features. Under a reliance test or a "presumption" test that requires knowledge of such a feature prior to purchase, the buyer
would not be entitled to that feature.
147. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 4 (1990).
148. Section 2-316(1) reads as follows:
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nocuous rule of construction, suggesting that courts should try to
reconcile manifestations of express warranties with words or
conduct that "limit warranty," if such a construction is reasonable. 49 It does not say "limit express warranties" because that
is impossible. This is followed by a reference to the parol evidence rule of section 2-202 and a statement that the only reason
section 2-316(1) exists is to make a disclaimer ineffective if there
is language of express warranty and inconsistent language disclaiming an express warranty. Thus, the present section 2316(1), albeit requiring some interpretation, clearly means just
what Llewellyn said originally: "If the agreement creates an
1 The
express warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative." 50
convoluted language of the present section 2-316(1) apparently
succeeded in satisfying the critics of the original draft, but that
was its only success. It is the kind of change that may have
prompted some snickering between Karl and his wife, Soia.
Why the reference to the parol evidence rule? At best, it is a
reminder that one could lose an express warranty that was
made prior to the execution of an integrated writing that did not
mention it. But the parol evidence rule has nothing to do with
written disclaimers or exclusions. It precludes the admissibility
of any prior agreement that "would certainly" have been included in a given type of writing by reasonable parties. 5 ' Suggest-

Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the
provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202)
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable.
Id. § 2-316(1).
149. Id.
150. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1952).
151. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (1990). I agree with the Article 2 Study Project concern
about the parol evidence rule. The fact that one has to find the U.C.C. parol evidence test (a modified Williston test) in a comment to the section on parol evidence
is a defect in an otherwise excellent statement of the "rule" which should be remedied. The modified Williston test is a better modern test and it should be found in
the statutory language. I also agree with the concern over printed, standardized
merger clauses, i.e., "integration" or "zipper" clauses that would attempt to bar any
prior or "contemporaneous" agreement of the parties. Such clauses should be inoperative unless separately signed by the party against whom they would otherwise operate. Parties who make deals believe that their factual bargain includes such agree-
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ing that the exclusion of disclaimer of warranties is "subject to"
the parol evidence rule simply adds another confusing element
to this convoluted section.'5 2 It is time to remove the "covert
tools"'5 3 from section 2-316(1) and simply announce that it is
impossible to disclaim express warranties. In the words of a
comment to the express warranty section, section 2-313,
In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law of
warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in
essence agreed to sell, the policy is adopted of those cases
which refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize a
material deletion of the seller's obligation."
2. Implied Warranties
The exclusion of implied warranties is currently found in
sections 2-316(2) and 2-316(3). Sections 2-316(2) and 2-316(3)(a)
provide rules for such exclusions based upon the statements of
the parties, oral or written, whereas subsections (3)(b) and (3)(c)
deal with exclusions of implied warranties by conduct. The section would be improved by incorporating the disclaimers by
statements in subsection (2) and the conduct exclusions in subsection (3).

ments. The parol evidence rule should not operate as a technical bar unless the

parties clearly intended to be bound only by the final and complete statement of
their agreement in their integrated writing. I would also suggest that the revisers
think about deleting "contemporaneous." Like Corbin, I believe that the extrinsic
matter sought to be introduced occurred either before or after the writing.
"Contemporaneous" is a weasel word that should be expunged. For more on the
parol evidence concept of the U.C.C., see John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence
Process and Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342 (1975). See also MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 60,

§ 84C.5.
152. I discuss the absurdity of courts finding disclaimers of express warranties to
be operative only after deciding that no express warranty exists in John E. Murray,
Jr., Basis of the Bargain: Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283,
303 (1982).
153. One of the well-known Llewellynisms is that, "Covert tools are never reliable
tools." Karl N. Llwewllyn, 0. Prausnitz, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (book
review).
154. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 4 (1990).
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In my revised section 2-316(2), I would require all disclaimers
to be evidenced by a writing and I would also require all disclaimers to be conspicuous. Implied warranty protection is so
basic and important to a buyer of goods that the buyer should
not be said to have surrendered that protection absent a clear
and conspicuous statement to that effect. The present section 2316(1) allows a disclaimer to be oral but adds that it "must mention" merchantability. It then suggests that if the disclaimer is
in writing, it "must be conspicuous." Apparently, it need not be
"conspicuous" if it is oral, so that one would not have to shout
that the implied warranty is being disclaimed. The "as is" or
"with all faults" (or other language) disclaimer of implied warranties in the current section 2-316(3)(a) need not be conspicuous. Again, my revision would incorporate all of these methods
of disclaimer in section 2-316(2) and require all of them to be
conspicuously set forth in writing. I would still require the word
"merchantability" to be used and I would not allow "other language" to be used, as is currently permitted under section 2316(3)(a).'55 Under my suggestion, a revised section 2-316(3)
should combine the disclaimers currently found in subsections
(3)(b) and (3)(c).
3. Consumer and Warranty Disclaimers
The revised Article 2 could strike a major blow in favor of
consumers by precluding any disclaimer of any implied warranty
or any limitation on its duration with respect to a consumer

buyer. Though the Magnuson-Moss Act 6' precludes disclaimers of the implied warranty of merchantability in consumer
goods, the duration of such warranties may be limited to the
duration of the express warranty.'5 7 In this sense, Magnuson-

155. "Transaction costs" arise in allowing "other language" to be used. I was particularly troubled by the transaction costs that would attend the recommendation of
the Preliminary Report of the Article 2 Study Group that, if the buyer has knowl-

edge of the disclaimer, such disclaimer should be effective even if it is not "conspicuous." PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 106. The Study Group later re-

treated from this position with respect to disclaimers of the implied warranty of
merchantability affecting consumers. See infra note 158.
156. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988).

157. Id. § 2308.
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Moss is a snare and a delusion. 5 ' Because of the four-year
statute of limitations in U.C.C. section 2-725, the duration of the
implied warranty protection of consumers would be limited to
four years from the time the goods are delivered to the original
buyer.
I fully recognize the major impact of this suggestion, but it
does seem that we finally should admit that consumers have no
idea of what they are doing with respect to warranty protection.
Statutes requiring disclosure and various conspicuous statements have failed. The complexity of different lemon laws leaves
the consumer confused and often unprotected. Without removing
any consumer protection in terms of remedy, the preclusion of
any disclaimer or limitation on duration of implied warranties
would provide a sound basis for an effective, uniform consumer
protection concept. A revised Article 2 need not develop a comprehensive consumer protection maze. This change, alone, would
do more for consumer protection than all extant efforts to assure
the consumer that the goods she purchases are genuinely merchantable and, where she has relied upon the seller's skill and
judgment in selecting the goods for a known purpose, that they
are fit for that purpose.
C. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties
Here, I content myself with the suggestion that section 2317(c), which provides that "[e]xpress warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose"159 should be left alone. The Article 2 Study Group disagreed as to whether an inconsistent express warranty should displace both types of implied warran-

158. The Article 2 Study Group added two recommendations to its earlier recommendations on warranty disclaimers, both involving consumer protection: (1) the implied warranty should not be disclaimable where the seller makes a written warranty that is subject to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; (2) if a written warranty
subject to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is made, Article 2 should require the
same disclosure as that required by federal law. The Study Group "retreated" from
its earlier position that a disclaimer should be effective if the buyer had actual
knowledge of the disclaimer. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 105-08.
159. U.C.C. § 2-317(c) (1990).
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ty.60 There is a clear distinction between express warranties
where reliance should not be a factor and implied warranties of
fitness for a particular purpose where reliance, along with other
elements, is necessary.16 Section 2-317(c) recognizes this distinction and it is sound. 1
D. Privity-ThirdParty Beneficiaries-ProductsLiability
The Article 2 Study Project aptly calls the present version of
section 2-318 an "anachronism" 6 2 and correctly calls the caption, "third party beneficiaries" a "fiction."'63 There was express or implied unanimous agreement among the members of
the Committee that a buyer could bring an action against a
remote seller, typically a manufacturer, if the action was based
on express warranty but not on an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. Absent direct dealing with a seller,
there would appear to be no basis for discovering the elements of
section 2-315, upon which a fitness warranty for a particular
purpose could be based.
The disagreement among the Committee was centered on an
action against a remote seller for breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability where the goods were unmerchantable when
they left the remote seller's possession.'" One view suggests
that where the action is based on breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability, vertical privity should be restored to section
2-318. Vertical privity would be restored whether the plaintiff
was a commercial or consumer buyer, thereby precluding a recovery against a remote manufacturer, regardless of the nature
of the loss. Moreover, the Committee recommended that the
remote seller should be able to exclude or limit liability to the
dealer through an appropriate clause, regardless of the type of
injury suffered by the ultimate purchaser. The Committee would
permit express exceptions for express warranties or situations in

160. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 109.
161. See The Singer Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 579 F.2d 433 (8th Cir.
1978).
162. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 109.
163. Id. at 110.
164. Id. at 111.
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which the plaintiff is an assignee of a warranty made by the
seller to the plaintiffs assignor.'65 Another view suggests
that the privity requirement imposes unrealistic and unfair
limitations upon a manufacturer's responsibility for unmerchantable goods. When these limitations are combined with
the judicial refusal to impose tort liability [involving] only
economic loss, there is less incentive for [the manufacturer]
to improve product quality and buyers are left to the vagaries
of the contracting process and the risk that their seller will
be insolvent or out of business."
I suggest that a buyer reasonably expects to receive merchantable goods from a manufacturer or other remote seller. In terms
of technical barriers and the recognition of the factual bargain of
the parties, the dealer from whom a branded product is purchased is often irrelevant in the mind of the buyer. The manufacturer may avoid any express warranty by restricting its advertising statements to commendation, value or other "puff." To
leave the buyer with goods that were unmerchantable when they
left the factory is the ultimate recognition of form over substance. Section 2-318 should expressly abolish vertical and horizontal privity. We continue to forget that "privity," itself, is an
anachronism. It is merely the name of a legal relation arising
from right and obligation." 7 If we decide that right and obligation exist, the party is "in privity" and the converse is true. Privity is a legal conclusion which, by itself, is meaningless. Whatever the policy decision concerning an action against a remote
manufacturer, it would be highly desirable to rid section 2-318 of
any notion that "privity" is something more than it is.
There is the matter of dealing with bodily injury and injury to
property under section 2-318, now that section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is widely recognized. It has long been
an open secret that Llewellyn had precociously created a com-

165. Id. at 111-12.

166. Id. at 112 (citing Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the
Privity Requirement: Once More into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 35-37 (1987)).

167. See the memorable statement of Justice Stone in La Mourea v. Rhude, 295
N.W. 304 (Minn. 1940): "Privity, in the law of contracts, is merely the name for a

legal relation arising from right and obligation." Id. at 307.
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prehensive products liability concept in a very early draft, which
he proffered as part of his new Code, only to be told that he
should keep tort law out of a sales statute.' More than two
decades later, Professor Prosser and friends finally promulgated
Restatement section 402A. In the meantime, because warranty
theory had developed as a strict liability standard, Llewellyn felt
compelled to include something in Article 2 to reflect that reality. Article 2, therefore, mentions "injury to person or property
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty"" 9 as one
of the definitions of consequential damages in section 2715(2)(b). It had to be snuck in the back door. The central question is, now that we have two mutually exclusive theories, how
should we achieve symmetry?
Some time ago, Pennsylvania seemed to be moving in the
direction of complete symmetry by suggesting that the caption
atop the complaint should make no difference. 70 If actions for
either breach of warranty or violations of section 402A are recognized for injury to the person or damage to property, there
should be complete symmetry. This would require the abolition
of privity and any remaining notice requirement under U.C.C.
section 2-607(3)(a) that would not be required under 402A of the
Restatement.'7 ' The U.C.C. statute of limitations in section 2725 should be emphatically restricted to contracts cases, i.e., loss
of bargain cases. 72 The notion that a party may still bring a
168. For an appreciation of Llewellyn's precocious efforts in this area, see John B.
Clutterbuck, Note, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enterprise
Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131 (1988).
169. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1990).
170. See John E. Murray, Jr., Products Liability-Another Word, 35 U. PrIT. L.
REV. 255, 256 (1973); see also Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.
1980) (relying upon the Murray analysis), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).

171. Comment 5 to § 2-607 indicates that various beneficiaries do not fall within
the reason of the section concerning discovery of -defects and the giving of notice
within a reasonable time after acceptance of the goods. Such beneficiaries have nothing to do with acceptance of the goods. The comment goes on to suggest that even
such beneficiaries, however, must notify the seller that an injury has occurred.
U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 5 (1990).
172. I prefer the more specific description, "loss of bargain" to the more general
"economic loss." This is not to suggest that such language changes, alone, will be
sufficient to provide absolute clarity to courts faced with the difficult problem of
deciding whether a particular loss is essentially contractual or tortious in nature.

See, e.g., Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 471 N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 1991).
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warranty action after section 402A's shorter torts statute of
limitations has run is absurd. 173 The sheer coincidence that the
goods were delivered to the buyer within four years of the filing
of the action should not permit a party to circumvent section
402A's statute of limitations. It is equally absurd to preclude an
action by a party sustaining bodily injury because the goods
were delivered more than four years prior to the injury and the
caption atop the plaintiffs complaint called the action one for
breach of warranty. 7 4 If the action is for bodily injury or property damage, the torts (discovery) statute of limitations should
apply. If the action is for economic loss in the form of a lost bargain, the present section 2-725 four year limitation from the
time of tender of delivery should apply. The courts could have
settled this matter.'7 5 Again, Llewellyn overestimated them.
Finally, section 2-725 should remove the last scintilla of argument concerning the application of section 402A to loss of bargain claims. The U.C.C. must have exclusive application to such

claims.
IV.

UNCONSCIONABILITY

Some may be thrilled to learn that U.C.C. section 2-302 on
unconscionability is now understood as part of general contract
law, as evidenced by a replication of section 2-302 in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 208, and, therefore, requires

173. See Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 467 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1983).
174. Prior to the adoption of § 402A in New York, such a holding was countenanced in Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 291 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1967),
affd, 253 N.E.2d 207 (N.Y. 1969).
175. In Williams, the lower court concluded that the four year statute of limitations
in § 2-725 should not be read to apply to third-party beneficiaries injured by the
product because it has nothing to do with such parties, Williams, 467 A.2d at 81718, just as notice of breach after acceptance of goods under § 2-607(3)(a) has nothing
to do with such third-party beneficiaries. See supra note 171. A third-party beneficiary is not an "aggrieved party" under § 2-725(2) until such party is "entitled to resort
to a remedy," i.e., until she is injured. U.C.C. § 1-201(2) (1990). A buyer, however, is
an "aggrieved party" from the time of the tender of delivery of the goods, "regardless
of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach." Id. § 2-725(2). The court
could not discover a way to exclude a buyer from § 2-725. Thus, to be "fair," it held
that § 2-725 had to apply to both buyers and third parties. In this, of course, the
court failed to consider the purpose of § 2-725, which has nothing to do with injury
to person or damage to property.
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no revision. 76 Others may be startled to learn that section 2302, which Arthur Leff once called "an emotionally satisfying
incantation" demonstrating that "it is easy to say nothing with
words" requires no revision. 77 The statutory language is devoid of any test to determine what is and what is not unconscionable. Leff was correct. It is emotionally satisfying, but that's it.
If it is desirable to state a relatively clear parol evidence test in
the statutory language rather than in the comments to section
2-202, as the Study Project Committee suggests,7 8 it certainly
seems desirable to state the basic unconscionability tests in
section 2-302. Notwithstanding the substantial drafting challenge, the basic concepts of unfair surprise and oppression could
be stated as the fundamental concepts of unconscionability. The
comments then could elaborate and illustrate these concepts to
further explain the unexpected and adhesive forms of unconscionability. If the basic tests were set forth in the revised section, the application of unconscionability could be elaborated in
the comments. Certainly, the application of the doctrine to merchant contracts should be clarified, and I believe expanded, at
least in the comments.' 9 The argument that adherence to the
formulas required to disclaim implied warranties precludes
unconscionability should be expressly rejected with clear state-

176. This is the view of the Article 2 Study Project. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra
note 13, at 79-80. The Committee does recommend, however, substantial revisions in
the comments to § 2-302 to clarify certain matters the Committee addresses on
pages 80 and 81.
177. See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 558-59 (1967). It should be noted that the Study
Group does recommend changes in the comments to § 2-302 to clarify, inter alia, the
scope and content of the standard.
178. See supra note 151.
179. The basic distinction between a party who meets the broad definition of a
"merchant" in 2-104(1) but who otherwise would not have reasonably understood the
fine print provided by a party with superior skill and bargaining power should be
emphasized. See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268 (E.D. Mich.
1976). I would also like to see a new direction concerning merchants who do or
should understand the fine print or other materially risk-shifting provisions that are
thrust upon them, allowing such merchants to pursue a "no choice" (adhesive) unconscionability argument more effectively. For example, in K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 263 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1970), the court focused exclusively upon what the
sophisticated plaintiffs should know and ignored the possibility of a severe lack of
choice. Id. at 393.
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ments that such adherence merely meets the threshold standards for recognition of such disclaimers.
There is a serious question as to whether consumers should be
bound by material risk-shifting clauses which they would have
little if any opportunity to understand. For example, where a
preprinted form contains an exclusion of consequential damages,
it may be desirable to view such a clause as prima facie unconscionable with respect to a consumer buyer. 8 ° The Study
Group, however, has recommended the deletion of language in
section 2-719(3) that declares a limitation on consequential damages in the case of consumer goods prima facie unconscionable
where there is injury to the person. This is consistent with the
Study Group's earlier recommendation that privity be reincarnated in section 2-318, even in cases involving injury to the
person. Under my recommendation, the implied warranty of
merchantability should not be disclaimable with respect to a
consumer. Consumer buyers should never lose that warranty.
If consumers retained the implied warranty of merchantability
without limitation and if limitations on consequential damages
were prima facie unconscionable as to consumers, that protection, along with remedial assistance such as that already afforded by other state and federal legislation, finally would provide a
level of protection consonant with a consumer's reasonable expectations and inability to understand or bargain out of material
risk-shifting clauses. The reactions to such changes from some
manufacturers would range from alarm to hysteria. Such reactions would be baseless.
We have moved from the ninety day and (later) one-year and
12,000 mile warranty on new automobiles to three-year "bumper-to-bumper" express warranties and even longer express warranties against specified defects. The total consumer protection
legislation in America has not caused this change. The cause
was something called competition-essentially competition from
180. In Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987), the court held such a clause unenforceable even as to an
automobile wholesaler without relying upon unconscionability. The court, instead,
found no assent to such a clause by the plaintiff and applied a "circle of assent"
analysis suggested by the author in an earlier edition of Murray on Contracts. Id. at
638; see JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 352 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
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the Japanese. The quality of American automobiles has improved substantially because of this competition and not because
of our legislation. We continue to live with ridiculously poor
warranty protection with respect to electronic devices because
Americans do not manufacture these products and there is no
competition with the Japanese and Pacific Rim manufacturers.
American business is now consumed with a "total quality"
concept to ascertain global competitiveness. Precluding disclaimers of implied warranties or exclusions of consequential damages
at least in consumer products would further fuel the incentive to
American corporations to create total quality products for sale
throughout America and the world.
V. CURE, REJECTION, REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE, AND
PERFECT TENDER

As the Study Project Committee recommends, section 2-508
should be revised to permit cure where the buyer justifiably has
revoked acceptance of the goods."8 ' If a buyer accepts the goods
and "contract time" remains, there is no satisfactory reason to
preclude the seller's right to cure. The obstacle is the current
section 2-508, which expressly contemplates only rejection. If,
however, a buyer accepts goods and contract time remains,
should a seller be precluded from its right to cure simply because the buyer has accepted the goods under one of the three
methods of acceptance in section 2-606(1)? Refusing the seller's
attempt at cure under these circumstances augurs bad faith.
Where contract time has expired, this rationale disappears.
Section 2-508(2), however, does allow cure even where time has
expired if the seller has reasonable grounds to believe its tender
would be acceptable with or without a money allowance. It is
interesting to consider the statement of the Article 2 Study
Group concerning section 2-508(2):
The Study Group disagreed on whether a "cure" should be
permitted after acceptance and after the time for performance had passed, even though the acceptance had been

rightfully revoked under section 2-608(1). Resolution of this

181. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 140-41.
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issue is left for the Drafting Committee and, in any event,
depends upon whether the "perfect" tender rule in section 2601 is retained or rejected. 8 '
Under the current section 2-508(2) which begins with the
phrase, "Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender.... ,"' cure after acceptance would be impossible. "Acceptance" may occur in three ways under section 2-606(1): (a) the
buyer signifies that the goods are conforming or that he will
take them in spite of their non-conformity; (b) the buyer fails to
make an effective rejection after a reasonable opportunity to
inspect, or (c) the buyer does any act inconsistent with the
seller's ownership of the goods."8 The current section 2-508(2)
contemplates none of these methods of acceptance for the obvious reason that its operative effect is expressly conditioned upon
the buyer's rejection. If the goods have been accepted in any of
these three ways, the buyer cannot reject. Thus, section 2-508(2)
currently is predicated upon the fact that there is still time to
reject and the buyer, in fact, rejects the goods. Acceptance thereafter in any form is not contemplated by section 2-508(2).185
If section 2-508 is revised to allow cure after revocation of
acceptance,'8 6 the question is whether a seller who has reasonable grounds to believe such a tender would be acceptable may
still cure. Because revocation of acceptance can only occur where
there is substantial impairment of the value of the goods to the
buyer and at least one of two other conditions have been
met,8 7 it may be difficult for a seller to prove that it had rea182. Id. at 143.

183. U.C.C. § 2-508(2) (1990).
184. Id. § 2-606(1)(a)-(c).
185. Even if the buyer, after rejecting, would perform an act inconsistent with the
seller's ownership of the goods which would be wrongful against the seller, such an
act would constitute acceptance of the goods only if the seller ratified such act as an
acceptance. Id. § 2-606(1)(c).
186. This modification easily could be inserted in § 2-508(2) as follows: "Where the
buyer rejects or revokes acceptance of a non-conforming tender . .. ."
187. Section 2-608(1) requires not only substantial impairment of the value to the
buyer but one of two other conditions: (a) the buyer accepted the goods on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be cured and it has not been
cured, or (b) the buyer did not discover the nonconformity in time to reject because
of the difficulty of discovering a latent defect or the seller had assured the buyer
that no such defect existed. U.C.C. § 2-608(1)(a)-(b) (1990).
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sonable grounds to believe that such a nonconforming tender
would be acceptable. Such a situation, however, is not inconceivable. If a seller can establish such reasonable grounds, a buyer's
rejection or revocation of acceptance under these circumstances
is necessarily unreasonable. Why, then, should such a seller be
deprived of "a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender""' simply because the buyer has revoked his acceptance
rather than rejected the goods? The distinction appears to be
technical and artificial. I would recommend, therefore, that both
sections 2-508(1) and 2-508(2) be revised to contemplate revocation of acceptance as well as rejection.
A related concern is whether the "perfect tender" rule of section 2-601 should be retained. A majority of the Study Group
recommends its retention with the addition of an express "good
faith" requirement.'89 Expressing that which is necessarily implied to alert sellers that they cannot get away with technical
rejections is not a bad idea. If that is all that the revisers are
willing to do, I certainly agree. But what does it really do? It
directs courts to preside over litigation that will focus upon the
extent of the nonconformity and whether the buyer was apparently rejecting not because of the nonconformity but for other
reasons, such as a falling market price. Under this test, a rejection could be in good faith even though there is no substantial
impairment of the value of the goods to the buyer. Yet, where
there is no such substantial impairment, the suspicion of a rejection for reasons unrelated to the nonconformity will be present.
Because the present "perfect tender" rule is anything but absolute 90 and there is a dearth of case law on bad faith rejections
(which might change with an express good faith requirement), it
is time to change to a substantial impairment of value test.
Whether a given nonconformity substantially impairs the value
of goods will spawn a certain amount of litigation. But that

188. Id. § 2-508(2).
189. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 157-59.

190. The present rule is subject to the parties' agreement to the contrary, § 2-601,
an implied good faith limitation, the seller's right to cure, § 2-508, the loss of the
right to reject upon the occurrence of any of the three methods of acceptance in § 2606(1), and the application of the substantial impairment of value test in installment
contracts, § 2-612.

1502

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1447

question is essentially one of whether the breach is material-a
concept which is familiar to courts. The new test avoids any
necessity of dealing with questions of good faith in relation to an
immaterial breach, as it much more forcefully and clearly tells
buyers that they had better have a sound reason for rejection.
VI. NOTICE UNDER SECTION 2-607(3)(A)
Like the Study Group, I recommend a change in the notice
test of section 2-607(3)(a) which emanates from curious language
in current comment 4. The comment begins by saying that notice of breach with respect to accepted goods under section 2607(3)(a) need only indicate that the transaction is still troublesome, i.e., it would not be necessary to expressly inform the
seller that the buyer is treating the contract as breached. Later
in the same comment, however, there is a statement that the
seller must be informed "that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach ...

.""' Where a buyer is cajoling a seller to

perform, a notice that informs the seller that upon completion of
performance the buyer intends to sue the seller is counterproductive to maintaining the contract and furthering complete
performance, which is presumably the intention of the section 2607(3)(a) notice requirement.'92 The statutory language should
contain the notice test and it should not require notice of express claim of breach.
VII. THE "SUBJECTIVE" TEST OF SECTION 2-608
A revision should clarify the "subjective" test of section 2608(1): "The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its
value to him ... .""' Any remaining doubt about the test is
removed by a comment which makes it clear the test is whether
the nonconformity will, in fact, cause a substantial impairment
191. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (1990).
192. Though the court in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532
F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976), seemed to appreciate this fact, it still suggested a notice
that would inform the seller that the buyer is treating delays in delivery as breaches. Id. at 973.
193. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1990).
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to the buyer though the seller had no advance knowledge as to
the buyer's particular circumstances.1 4 Because our courts are
surrounded by objective tests, they have not been entirely comfortable with this subjective test and have largely concluded that
the test is "subjective" in that substantial impairment is determined as to the actual buyer with his idiosyncracies rather than
a reasonable buyer. 95 Thus, whether there was substantial impairment "to him" depends objectively on whether the value of
the goods would be substantially impaired to someone "like
him." This is a reasonable clarification that should be more
clearly manifested in the section or, at least, in the comments.
VIII. REMEDIES

The product of the Article 2 Study Project dealing with buyer
and seller remedies may be the single most important contribution made by the Study Group. 9 ' It is extremely important to
begin the section on remedies in section 2-701 with a general
restatement of the protection of the expectation interest and
recognition of the reliance and restitution interests. The general
principles of mitigation should pervade the entire remedial context, include a general principle that remedies are cumulative,
and should reject any artificial doctrine of election of remedies. 9' I have no disagreement with the specific recommendations of the Study Group in any remedial section. I am in emphatic agreement that section 2-718(1) should be revised to reaffirm the purpose of liquidated damages clauses as good faith
forecasts of likely damages at the time the contract is formed
with no concern for actual damages. The present section 2-718(1)
allows for the enforcement of clauses intended to be penalties at
the time of contract formation only because actual unforeseeable
damages occur.'98 It is unfortunate that the Restatement (Sec-

194. Id. § 2-608 cmt. 2.

195. See, e.g., Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65 (Idaho 1983);
Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 370 A.2d 270 (N.H. 1977).
196. PRELILNARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 193-247.
197. Id. at 194-96.
198. See MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 60, § 125B.3.

1504

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1447

ond) of Contracts drafters felt compelled to 'Tollow the Code" by
replicating this faulty analysis.19 9
IX. FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE
In light of the confusion in the case law and commentary
concerning "failure of essential purpose" in section 2-719(2), that
section requires considerable clarification.0 ° Section 2-719(1)
allows the parties to agree upon different remedies, including
limitations upon normal Article 2 remedies such as repayment of
the purchase price or repair or replacement of nonconforming
goods. If a buyer agrees to a remedy such as repair and replacement of nonconforming goods and that remedy fails of its essential purpose under section 2-719(2) (the seller cannot or will not
cure), what is the buyer's replacement remedy? Certainly the
buyer should be able to effectuate cure through another source
(i.e., either repair or replacement of the nonconforming goods).
This would provide the buyer with direct damages. The recurring problem, however, is whether the buyer is entitled to normal consequential damages under circumstances where the
contract expresses an exclusion of these damages.
Parties can agree, of course, that consequential damages will
be excluded regardless of the failure of a sole and exclusive
remedy, so long as "minimum adequate remedies" or "a fair
quantum of remedy" are available.2"' The problem is whether
they, in fact, so agreed. Again, we inquire into their true understanding or the genuine factual bargain of the parties. Careful
drafting can emphasize the "sole and exclusive" nature of the
limited remedy and it can separate the exclusion of the consequential damages clause from the substituted repair or replacement warranty to emphasize its independent exclusion, regardless of what occurs with respect to the sole and exclusive limited
remedy. It may even go so far as to state expressly the consequences of the failure of essential purpose of the limited remedy

199. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1979).

200. For an analysis of the different judicial approaches at this time, see Cooley v.
Big Horn Harvestore Sys., Inc., 813 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1991).
201. U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1990). The Study Group suggests that "fair quantum"
may be more precisely stated. See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 13, at 237.

1994]

ROMANCING THE PRISM

1505.

(e.g., restitution of the purchase price in exchange for the goods)
with an intention to exclude consequential damages. °2 The
question then arises whether such a clause may be unconscionable.
As suggested earlier, the judicial reaction to an unconscionability argument between merchants has not been favorable. If
consequential damages are to be excluded even where the limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose, section 2-719
should be revised in the section language and/or the comments
to police against any unfair surprise or oppression with respect
to even carefully drafted clauses. The most certain method
would require separate authentication of such a clause by the
purchaser. Short of that, section 2-719 should indicate that the
exclusion of consequential damages where the remedy has failed
of its essential purpose is prima facie unconscionable. At a minimum, the comments to section 2-719 should encourage an exconcept of unconscionability under such circumstancpanded
20 3
es.
Finally, the comments to section 2-719 might address the
problem of the situation where repair or replacement occurs but
the cure takes longer than either buyer or seller would have
anticipated. To take a paradigmatic situation, a new generator is
defective and the manufacturer-seller spends a great deal of
time and effort repairing the sophisticated defect. While the
buyer is pleased with the repair effort, it has been forced to
purchase substitute power over several months at great cost.
The buyer signed a contract excluding consequential damages,
but, quaere, should the entire risk of unanticipated
consequentials fall upon the buyer? Remembering that it was
the seller's defective product that caused the loss, it may be
desirable to allow courts to allocate the consequentials between
the parties in a fair fashion to ascertain decent commercial practice in accordance with the underlying philosophy of Article 2.
Though I recognize that such a new design may appear quite
202. See Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equip. Co., 595 A.2d 1190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
203. Id. at 1195-96. In this case, the court affirms an analysis of unconscionability

to which I am particularly partial. It had been adopted previously in Germantown
Manufacturing Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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radical in our "all-or-nothing" remedial system, if Article 2 is to
promote decency in commercial relationships, the new Article 2
should foster that purpose.0 4
X. CONCLUSION

It is difficult to ponder a revision of Article 2 without wondering what Karl Llewellyn would have recommended in light of
four decades of experience. I believe he would not only have kept
the Article 2 prism intact but would have used all of his creative
energy to deepen its underlying philosophy. He would have
warred against technical and artificial barriers that were not
destroyed at the outset as well as those "covert tools" that have
since been developed by courts and others. I believe that he
would have focused even more intensely on the factual bargain
of the parties as the central theme in Article 2. I can see
Llewellyn with shirt sleeves rolled up, hands stuffed in hip pockets, standing before a group of the most learned and telling
them in no uncertain terms how they got it wrong and how it
must be changed. He would provide them with demonstrations
of decency in myriad commercial relationships to illustrate any
needed changes. He would ask all of us to assume certain risks
to ascertain that such decency prevails and that the last
lawyer's trick is abandoned.
It is time to assume those risks. It is time to recognize the
monumental contribution of Karl Llewellyn and the fact that his
basic purpose was good and true. It is time to reaffirm that pur-

204. Comment 6 to § 2-615 (the commercial impracticability section) suggests the
use of "equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith"
where "neither sense nor justice is served by either answer when the issue is posed
in flat terms of 'excuse' or 'no excuse.' " Unfortunately, this invitation has seen preciously little judicial application. For a rare suggestion of its desirability, see the
concurring opinion in McGinnis v. D. B. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 779 (W. Va. 1984).
See also Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DuKE L.J. 1 (discussing the limited but effective
applicability of judicial modification of contracts); M.N. Kniffin, A Newly Identified
Contract Unconscionability: Unconscionability of Remedy, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
247 (1988) (discussing the innovativeness and practical applicability of § 351(3) of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts on the unconscionability of remedy).
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pose and to create a new Article 2 that he would view as the
perfection of his earlier work. All of this is necessary because
Karl Llewellyn was not only precocious, he was right.

